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and EU Administrative Law
I. Introduction 
1. Anno 2016, the law of many European countries anchors a general duty 
for members of the executive and their administrations to give reasons 
for their decisions (administrative acts). The EU, as a supranational legal 
order, knows a  similar obligation for its institutions and administrative 
bodies. For the purpose of this contribution, the term ‘duty to give reasons’ 
covers the obligation for the administration to communicate the reasons 
for its decisions on its own initiative, at least to those that are directly 
affected by them.
2. In a 21st-century (western) context, it may seem quite inconceivable 
that national administrations would not be obliged to give reasons for 
their decisions. In many states, however, the duty to give reasons is quite 
a  recent achievement. For the judiciary, the modern state has always 
accepted that its judgments have to be underpinned by a proper and full 
justification. This principle is enshrined in most constitutions and is 
enforced by the highest courts.2 It has taken much longer for a  duty of 
1  Prof. dr. Ingrid Opdebeek, Full Professor Administrative Law, University of Ant-
werp (Belgium); Dr. Stéphanie De Somer, Fellow FWO Flanders University of Antwerp 
(Belgium), research group Government & Law.
2  For Belgium, see Article 149 of the Constitution; for the Netherlands, see Article 
121 of the Constitution. In France, the duty to provide reasons for the courts is rec-
ognised and upheld by the highest courts as having constitutional value. In the EU, 
Article 36 of Protocol no. 3 to the TFEU provides that the ECJ’s judgments shall state the 
reasons on which they are based. Even though the guarantee of reasoned judgments is 
taken for granted by many nowadays, it is still regularly debated. See e.g. M. Adams, 
De argumentatieve en motiveringspraktijk van hoogste gerechtshoven: rechtsvergelijkende 
beschouwingen, “Rechtskundig Weekblad” 2009, vol. 72, issue 36, p. 1498–1511; Vlad 
E. Perju, Reason and Auhority in the European Court of Justice, “Virginia Journal of 
International Law” 2009, no. 49, p. 307–378. 
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reason-giving to become a fundamental guarantee for citizens faced with 
the (coercive) power of the executive or the administration. Moreover, 
unlike other guarantees developed over the years to offer protection 
against a  malfunctioning, secretive or arbitrary administration, such as 
the regime of the ombudsman or freedom of information, the duty to 
give reasons is only poorly covered by doctrinal literature. The right 
to reasons and the practice of administrative reason-giving has been called 
a ‘somewhat undertheorised’ feature of both the US and EU tradition of 
administrative law.3
3. This article has a double aim. The first part (II) contains the results 
of a thorough comparative analysis of the duty to give reasons as conceived 
by and guaranteed in three European national legal systems, i.e. Belgium, 
the Netherlands and France, on the one hand and the supranational system 
of the EU on the other hand. The focus is on general similarities and 
differences; the article does not scrutinise details. The following questions 
are addressed: 
 – What are the legal sources that enshrine the duty to give reasons? 
 – What are the rationales behind such a (more or less) general duty for the 
administration? 
 – What is the scope of the duty?
 – And its purport? 
 – Which sanction(s) does the administration risk in case of non-compli-
ance? 
4. The use of comparative analysis in the European legal sphere is often 
located in the promise of the identification of a European common ground. 
Our comparative analysis indeed confirms that the selected European 
legal systems share a core understanding of what the duty to give reasons 
entails. At the same time, it also reveals some important differences in the 
way that each of these systems individually conceives of that duty. By using 
comparative tables after most of the sections, we try to facilitate the efforts 
of the reader to keep an overview. 
5. Considering the aim of our comparative analysis, every single 
national European legal system would, in principle, have been equally 
eligible to be included in this study. Our selection of national legal systems 
comprising Belgium, France and the Netherlands allows us to demonstrate 
that even legal systems whose traditions of administrative law are strongly 
intertwined have developed such regimes of mandatory reasongiving for 
their administrations that they all have their own features and sometimes 
differ on fundamental points. 
6. The second part (III) of the article is more evaluative in nature. It 
aims to shed a light on the role that the duty to give reasons plays or could 
3  J. L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: the European Union, the United States, and 
the Project of Democratic Governance, “Faculty Scholarship Series” 2007, Paper 1179, 
p. 101. 
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play for the legitimacy of administrative decision-making. It starts from 
the hypothesis that the duty to give reasons, as defined in this article, as 
such has great potential as a  mechanism of accountability. Procedural 
guarantees play an increasingly important role in the attempts of 
modern governments to achieve the goals of transparent and accountable 
administration. We rely on the work of Jerry L. Mashaw and Hans Peter 
Nehl to give a proper theoretical underpinning to the role that the duty 
to give reasons plays (or can potentially play) in achieving accountability 
through transparency. We argue that the duty to give reasons, as conceived 
of by the legal systems that we have studied, has at least the potential of 
creating an effective form of accountability in the relationship between the 
administration and individuals affected by its decisions. Even though it 
does not offer a guarantee of genuine ‘public’ accountability, it mitigates the 
vertical link between the administration and those subject to its decisions. 
In doing so, it contributes to the emancipation of citizens as autonomous 
individuals in their relationship to state actors. 
7. In our final conclusions (IV), we establish, however, that even 
a  comparative analysis of only four European legal systems reveals that 
not all of them effectively and to the same extent approach the duty to 
give reasons as such an inalienable, fundamental right of citizens, linked 
to their moral autonomy and thus to the value of human dignity. As far 
as the future is concerned, the question arises whether the EU will foster 
harmonisation in this regard and whether this will eventually lead to 
the recognition of an individual fundamental right to receive reasons for 
administrative decisions, recognised throughout Europe. 
II. The duty to give reasons: a comparative analysis 
of four European legal systems
A. The legal sources of the duty to give reasons (WHERE?)
8. This article studies the duty to give reasons as a general guarantee, 
applicable to administrative acts in all or most sub-sectors of public of 
administrative intervention. Sometimes, however, specific legal (typically 
legislative) regimes, applicable to just one branch of administrative law 
or one type of decision, may impose specific duties on decision-makers. 
These may involve special, often more far-reaching requirements or may 
give further specifications as to the range of the duty to give reasons. 
A discussion of these leges speciales and of the question of how they relate to 
the general duty to give reasons falls outside the scope of this contribution. 
9. In France, the courts have dismissed the recognition of a general 
principle of administrative law that obliges the administration to give 
100
The Duty to Give Reasons in the European Legal Area… RAP 2016 (2)
reasons for its decisions.4 Only in those cases where either the legislation 
or case law5 has requires a statement of reasons will the administration 
be subject to an obligation to justify its decision explicitly.6 This lack 
of an always applicable duty to give reasons has made some doctrine 
conclude that ‘ le secret administrative’ still, to some extent at least, 
survives in France.7 The duty to give reasons was given a  substantial 
statutory enshrinement in 1979, in an act specifically dedicated to this 
legal guarantee (hereinafter: LMAA, Loi relative à la motivation des 
actes administratifs).8 Since 1 January 2016, this act has been abolished 
and its provisions are now part of the Code des relations entre le public et 
l’administration (hereinafter: CRPA).9 The application of the provisions 
on the duty to give reasons is not restricted to one or a number of specific 
sub-sectors of administrative law, making their scope ‘general’ within 
the meaning of this study. They do, however, only apply to decisions of 
a certain nature or purport (infra).10  
4  Conseil d’État 7 juillet 1978, no. 01593, CEVAPIC; e judgment revealed that ‘les 
décisions des autorités administratives n’ont pas, en règle générale, a être motivées ; que, 
s’il est fait exception à cette règle pour les décisions de certaines autorités collégiales, en 
raison notamment de leur mode de fonctionnement et de la nature de leurs attributions, 
la motivation n’est obligatoire, lorsque la décision émane d’une autorité personnelle, 
qu’autant qu’elle est expressément prévue par un texte’; Conseil Constitutionnel 1 juil- 
let 2004, no. 2004–497 DC: ‘[L]es règles et principes de valeur constitutionnelle 
n’imposent pas par eux-mêmes aux autorités administratives de motiver leurs décisions 
dès lors qu’elles ne prononcent pas une sanction ayant le caractère d’une punition.’ 
Both judgments are discussed in: O. Gabarda, Vers la généralisation de la motivation 
obligatoire des actes administratifs? Enjeux et perspectives d’évolutions autour du principe 
de la motivation facultative, “Revue Francaise de Droit Administratif” (“RFDA”) 2012, 
p. 61, 62.
5  J.-L. Autin, La motivation des actes administratifs unilatéraux, entre tradi-
tion nationale et évolution des droits européens “RFDA” 2011, no. 137–138, p. 85, 93; 
N. Songolo, La motivation des actes administratifs, la site de la «Village do la Justice. 
La communaute des metiers du Droit» ; http://www.village-justice.com/articles/motiva-
tion-actes-administratifs,10849.html (12.02.2015). e Conseil d’État has, for instance, 
required a statement of reasons for the decisions of so called ‘organismes professionels’ 
or ‘autorités collégiales’ (see previous footnote). 
6  See: M. Gros, Droit administratif. L’angle jurisprudentiel, L’Harmattan, Paris 
2012, p. 141: ‘[La motivation] a donc toujours été une exception, la règle étant l’absence 
de motivation’. 
7  J.-L. Autin, La motivation des actes administratifs unilatéraux, entre tradition 
nationale et évolution des droits européens “RFDA” 2011, no. 137–138, 85, 93; P.-L. Frier, 
J. Petit, Droit administratif , Montchrestien 2012, p. 348.
8  Loi no. 79–587 du 11 juillet 1979 relative à la motivation des actes administratifs 
et à l’amélioration des relations entre l’administration et le public. 
9  ey are enshrined in Livre II, Titre Ier, Chapitre Ier of the Code. 
10  See: J.-L. Autin, La motivation…: ‘Cette intervention du législateur doit être 
correctement appréciée: elle opère un changement quantitatif indéniable en multipliant 
les hypothèses de motivation obligatoire mais sur un fondement qualitatif inébranlable: 
l’absence de principe général.’
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10. Just like France, Belgium has a separate statutory act that anchors 
the duty to give reasons: a  federal11 legislative act of 199112, hereinafter 
abbreviated as the WMB (Wet Motivering Bestuurshandelingen). The 
scope of this act is not limited to a  list of specific types of decisions; in 
principle, it applies to all areas of administrative intervention. In three 
recent judgments, the Belgian Constitutional Court has suggested that the 
WMB has now obtained constitutional status. Consequently, the various 
Belgian legislatures (at the federal level and at the level of the regions and 
communities) cannot derogate from the protection that it offers. More 
precisely, they are obliged to uphold the principle that the reasons have 
to be communicated together with the decision, so that those reasons can 
lead to an informed choice about whether or not to seek judicial redress.13
11. In the Netherlands, the so called ‘General act administrative law’ 
(Algemene wet bestuursrecht or Awb) dedicates a separate section (3.7) to 
the duty to give reasons. 
12. Within the EU legal order, a  general obligation to give reasons 
for the EU institutions is anchored in the second paragraph of Article 
296 of the TFEU, which states that ‘[l]egal acts shall state the reasons 
on which they were based and shall refer to any proposals, initiatives, 
recommendations, requests or opinion required by the Treaties’. Another 
legal basis for a general duty to give reasons is found in Article 41 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which enshrines 
the right to good administration. This right includes ‘the obligation of the 
administration to give reasons for its decisions’. Note that the treaty defines 
reason giving by the administration as a duty, whereas the charter confers 
a (fundamental) right on citizens derived from a duty or obligation.14 Since 
the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the Charter has obtained a binding 
legal status and can be enforced by the national and European courts.15 
11  Belgium is a  federal country. e Constitutional Court has ruled that it falls 
within the competence of the federal legislature to enact general rules on the duty 
to give reasons, which also apply to the regions and communities. See: I. Opdebeek, 
A. Coolsaet, De wet motivering bestuurshandelingen: een korte, maar revolutionaire wet, 
in: Formele motivering van bestuurshandelingen, (eds.) I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, die 
Keure, Brugge 2013, p. 13–15. e Constitutional Court protects this competence and 
does not allow for the regional legislatures to derogate from the protection oered by 
the act. See: GwH 19 December 2013, no. 169/2013. 
12  Wet 29 July 1991 betreende de uitdrukkelijke motivering van de bestuurshan-
delingen, BS 12 September 1991. 
13  GwH 8 May 2014, no. 74/2014; GwH 16 July 2015, no. 103/2015; GwH 
29 October 2015, no. 152/2015.
14  See infra, where we will discuss the conception of reason-giving as a ‘right’. See 
also: O. Gabarda, Vers la généralisation…,p. 61, 68: ‘La Charte a cependant franchi une 
nouvelle étape en faisant référence à un droit subjectif à la motivation intéressant tous les 
citoyens de l’Union et en élargissant le champ d’application de la motivation obligatoire’. 
15  See Article 6(1) of the TEU: ‘e Union recognises the rights, freedoms and 
principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 
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The question arises whether this right to good administration targets only 
the EU institutions themselves, or also the administrations of the Member 
States. Pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter, which defines its scope, ‘[t]
he provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies 
of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the 
Member States only when they are implementing Union law.’ The first 
paragraph of Article 41, however, refers explicitly to ‘the institutions and 
bodies of the Union’, which seems to imply that it does not affect Member 
States.16 However, as unwritten general principles of law, recognised by 
the ECJ in its case law, the principles of good administration, such as the 
duty to give reasons, are applicable to Member States when they implement 
EU law.17 The analysis in this article, will focus, however, on the duties 
imposed on the EU institutions themselves. 
Finally, the ‘duty to justify reasons’ is also enshrined in the European 
Commission’s Code of Good Administrative Behaviour18, a soft law instru-
ment providing, according to its foreword, ‘a guide for Commission staff in 
their relations with the public’. Pursuant to Section 6 of the Code, members 
of the public may lodge complaints concerning a  possible breach of the 
principles set out in this Code, which will be treated by the relevant Com-
mission services. 
Schematic overview 19 
Legal source of the duty to give reasons as a (quasi) general obligation
Belgium Specific, separate statutory act on the duty to give reasons (WMB) with constitutional value. 
France
Until recently: specific, separate statutory act on the duty to give 
reasons (LMAA). Since 1 January 2016: part of a general statutory act 
on the relations between the administration and the public (CRPA). 
The 
Netherlands
Part of a general statutory act on the global functioning of the 
administration (Awb).
EU (Quasi)-constitutional
19 value (TFEU), fundamental right (Charter), 
general principle of law (case law) and anchored in soft law (Code). 
7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the 
same legal value as the Treaties.’
16  K. Kańska, Towards Administrative Human Rights in the EU. Impact of the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights “European Law Journal” 2004, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 296, 309; 
M. V. Kristjánsdóttir, Good Administration as a Fundamental Right, “Icelandic Review 
of Politics and Administration” 2013, vol. 9, issue 1, p. 237–255. See also: Case C-482/10 
Teresa Cicala v Regione Siciliana 2011, ECR I-14139, recital 28.
17  See: H. C. H. Hofmann, B. C. Mihaescu, e Relation between the Charter’s Fun-
damental Rights and the Unwritten General Principles of EU Law: Good Administra-
tion as the Test Case, “European Constitutional Law Review” 2013, vol. 9, issue 01, 
p. 73–101.
18  Published in OJ L 267, 20 October 2000. 
19 We do not take a position here on whether the EU treaties do or do not have con-
stitutional value, but they do constitute the highest written norms in the EU legal order. 
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B. The rationales behind the duty to give reasons (WHY?)
13. In France, Article L211–2 of the CRPA mentions the purpose or goal 
of the act, i.e. ‘to inform natural or legal persons, without delay, about the 
reasons underlying the unfavourable individual administrative decisions 
that concern them.’ The duty to give reasons has to contribute to the 
development of a relationship of confidence between the administration 
and citizens, in which transparency plays a key role. More precisely, citizens 
have to be able to gain a better comprehension of a decision, which makes 
it easier for them to challenge it with the courts.20 One author compares 
the duty to give reasons to the legislation on freedom of information and 
concludes that, although these guarantees should not be confused, they 
both initiate from the same concern: increasing transparency within the 
administration.21
14. The Belgian federal legislature has discerned three separate motives 
behind the enactment of the WMB: to provide legal subjects with better 
information, to facilitate oversight by administrative authorities and the 
judiciary and to ensure due or thorough decision-making. The first goal 
is of primary importance and was inspired by the belief that if citizens 
were informed about the reasons behind decisions, this would increase 
acceptability and could change the mind of the citizen who would otherwise 
be inclined to seek judicial redress.22 Or, if the reasons were unacceptable 
to the citizen, his/her right to challenge them would be more effective. 
This ties in with the second goal: the workload of the courts which have 
to assess the legality (lawfulness and reasonableness) of administrative 
decisions is reduced if the administration itself has to reveal its motives. 
The final motive departs from the premise that the administration will 
‘think twice’, if it has to provide reasons for its decisions, leading to more 
careful and balanced assessments.23
20  N. Songolo, La motivation… Although the Council of State has refused to 
recognise a general duty to give reasons (infra), it has deemed it possible to demand 
of the administration, in the course of a  judicial procedure, an explanation as to the 
reasons underlying the challenged administrative decision. If the administration 
refuses to do so, the burden of proof is reversed and the facts stated by the applicant 
are accepted as being correct. See: Conseil d’État 28 mai 1954, no. 28238, Barel. See: 
J.-L. Autin, La motivation des actes administratifs…, p. 85, 91–92.
21  Y. Gaudemet, Droit Administratif, Lextenso éditions, LGDJ, Paris 2012, p. 179. 
22  is goal has not been fullled, however. e WMB has given rise to more, not 
less litigation before the (administrative) courts. A shi  in grounds for a review has 
taken place: citizens now increasingly challenge the (lack of) reasons of administra-
tive acts. See: I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, De wet motivering bestuurshandelingen: een 
korte, maar revolutionaire wet, in: Formele motivering van bestuurshandelingen, (eds.) 
I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, die Keure 2013, p. 3, 11.
23  I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, De wet motivering bestuurshandelingen: een korte, maar 
revolutionaire wet, in: Formele motivering van bestuurshandelingen, (eds.) I. Opdebeek, 
A. Coolsaet, die Keure 2013, p. 3, 8–11 with multiple references to the parliamentary 
documents and debates preceding the WMB, to case law and to legal doctrine.
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15. In the Netherlands, an authoritative textbook on administrative 
law mentions the following rationales for the duty to give reasons: 
fostering the rationality of decision-making, contributing to the duty 
of state bodies to give account for their actions, facilitating judicial 
protection and adding consistency to administrative decision-making.24 
A  book on general principles of good administration discerns a  similar 
list of rationales: because of the duty to give reasons, the administration 
is forced to give due consideration to the contents of the decision, the 
acceptability of its decision increases, knowledge about policy increases, 
the consistency of policy improves, the number of appeals with the 
courts reduces and the interested party is better able to assess whether an 
appeal is useful.25 Yet another textbook, however, goes one step further 
by adopting a  more principled approach. It accepts that citizens hold 
a claim to an explanation by the administration, because the powers that 
the latter holds, are able to influence the individual’s ‘possibilities of self-
development’. From this perspective, citizens are not merely considered as 
‘objects’ of administrative action, but as conscious individuals who want 
to understand, explain, accept or challenge decisions that are taken with 
respect to them. ‘Consequently, the duty to give reasons is an extension of 
the general duty for state institutions to give account to the community 
and its members.’26 This rationale behind reason-giving, which takes the 
dignity of the individual as a human being as its starting point, will be 
discussed more thoroughly under title III. 
16. As ‘policy rationales’ underlying the duty to provide reasons in the 
EU, Craig mentions:
 – from the perspective of the affected parties: a more transparent deci-
sion-making process (‘so that they can know why a measure has been 
adopted’)27;
 – from the perspective of the decision-maker: ‘an obligation to give rea-
sons will help to ensure that the rationale for the action has been thought 
24  R. J. N. Schlössels, S. E. Zijlstra, Bestuursrecht in de sociale rechtsstaat, Kluwer 
2010, p. 462.
25  H. F. T. Pennarts, Beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur, Maklu, Apeldoorn-
Antwerpen 2008, p. 51. 
26  J. A. Damen, J. L. Boxum, K. J. de Graaf et al., Bestuursrecht (1) Deel I, Boom 
Juridische Uitgevers 2009, p. 431–432.
27  See also: J. Schwarze, European administrative law, Sweet and Maxwell, London 
2006, p. 1400–1401with reference to the case law, which regards this goal as primary: 
‘e statement of reasons for a sovereign measure is primarily intended to assist the 
addressees, they will discover from the reasons what motives have induced the authority 
to adopt the measure, thus enabling them more easily to judge the chances of success of 
any challenge of the act.’ and ‘In the foreground there is always the relationship between 
the authority and the addressee of sovereign measures.’ 
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through, since having to explain oneself, and defend the rationality of 
one’s choice, is always a salutary exercise’28; 
 – from the perspective of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), ‘the 
existence of reasons facilitates judicial review by, for example, enabling 
the Court to determine whether a decision was disproportionate.’29 
Other authors mention largely the same objectives, but add to this list 
the avoidance of arbitrariness.30 According to Schwarze, ‘the statement 
of reason is an authoritative source of information’, since ‘[i]ndications of 
a defect of substance can be revealed in the statement of reasons.’ This is 
especially so when it comes to the scrutiny of discretion exercised by the 
institution.31 Pursuant to the case law of the ECJ, the purpose of the duty 
to give reasons anchored in Article 296 of the TFEU is ‘first, to enable the 
persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure so that they can 
assess whether it is well founded and, secondly, to enable the competent 
court to exercise its power of review.’32
Another rationale behind the duty to give reasons in EU law is the 
conferred nature of the Union’s competences, enshrined in Article 5(2) of 
the TEU. The statement of reasons should clarify why the EU institution 
has deemed it legitimate to act. Such as justification is important from 
an intra-EU viewpoint, to justify why one of the institutions rather than 
the other was competent, as well as from a ‘vertical’ perspective, i.e. in the 
relationship between the Union and its Member States.33
Finally, it has been argued that the duty to give reasons contributes to 
the principle of transparency, enshrined in Article 1(2) of the TEU.34 
28  See: Ibidem, p. 1401: the author speaks of the promotion of ‘administrative 
self-regulation’. See also the references in: Y. Benfquih, K. Deckers, D. Verhoeven, De 
motiveringsplicht in het Europees bestuursrecht, “Tijdschri  voor Bestuurswetenschappen 
en Publiekrecht”, 2012, 67, 3, p. 140.
29  P. Craig, EU administrative law, Oxford University Press 2012, p. 340–341 with 
references to the case law of the ECJ. 
30  H. C. H. Hofmann, G. C. Rowe, A. H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of 
the European Union, Oxford University Press 2011, p. 200–202 with many references 
to case law.
31  J. Schwarze, European…, p. 1403 with references and 1411–1412.
32  See e.g. Case C-550/09 E and F, 2010, ECR I-06213, recital 54.
33  See e.g. Case C-370/07 Commission of the European Communities v Council of 
the European Union, 2009, ECR I-8917, recitals 38 . Geert De Baere, case note Case 
C-370/07, 2010, SEW 477, 478. See also: Y. Benfquih, K. Deckers, D. Verhoeven, De 
motiveringsplicht…, p. 136, 146. 
34  ‘is Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and 
as closely as possible to the citizen.’ (Emphasis added.) is position was, for instance, 
adopted by Advocate General Kokott in an opinion, delivered on 23 April 2009, in Case 
C–370/07, cited in the previous footnote (see recitals 57 and 58 of the opinion). See 
the reference (as well as another reference to an opinion of AG Sharpston in the same 
sense) in: Y. Benfquih, K. Deckers, D. Verhoeven, De motiveringsplicht…, p. 136, 141. 
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17. The conclusion of this comparison could be that, in all legal systems, 
the duty to give reasons is a tool that offers legal protection to citizens in 
a preventive way, but also assists in the full accomplishment of an effective 
system of ex post facto legal protection, by the courts. On the one hand, it 
forces administrative bodies to reflect on the legality, quality, rationality, 
reasonableness and fairness of their decisions, which may prevent bad 
decision-making in the first place. On the other hand, it provides citizens 
with a  basis on which they can build an argumentation for the courts, 
should they decide to challenge the decision. Consequently, legal protection 
of the individual is a key concern of the duty to give reasons.
18. Although not equally present in all four systems examined here, 
there is a more modern rationale that underlies (general, as well as specific) 
legal duties to give reasons as well: that of fostering the responsibility and 
accountability of the administration. Accountability is indeed increasingly 
mentioned as one of the values to which reasoned decision-making 
contributes. One French author, for instance, notes that the ambitions 
of the duty to state reasons have changed and evolved over the years: it 
is now expected to contribute to the goal of achieving ‘une démocratie 
administrative’.35 Much of the statements that have been made in this regard, 
however, have remained vague and have not addressed the preconditions 
for a causal relationship between reason-giving and accountability. Title 
VII of this article is dedicated to this question. 
C. The scope ratione personae and ratione materiae  
of the duty to give reasons (WHO and WHEN?)
1. Who is subject to the duty to give reasons? (WHO?)
19. The first question that arises when it comes to the scope of the duty 
to give reasons is how each of the legal regimes described above delineates 
the scope of the duty to give reasons ratione personae. Who, which parts 
of the administration, is subject to the general duty? In Belgium, the 
legislature has chosen to submit all ‘administrative authorities’ subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Council of State, the general and highest administrative 
court, to the regime of the WMB (Article 1). The delineation of the 
concept of ‘administrative authority’ (administratieve overheid / autorité 
administrative), for which no statutory definition exists, is a complex and 
much-debated issue, that will not be discussed here.36 For the purpose of 
this article, it is sufficient to say that it includes all traditional persons 
See also: A. Buijze, e principle of transparency in EU law, PhD dissertation, Utrecht 
University 2013; http://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/269787 (14.03.2015).
35  J.-L. Autin, La motivation…, p. 85, 86, 89 and 98. 
36  For an overview, see: S. De Somer, Toepassingsgebied ratione personae van de Wet 
Motivering Bestuurshandelingen, in: Formele motivering van bestuurshandelingen, (eds.) 
I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, die Keure 2013, p. 17–54. 
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and bodies within the executive (the federal, regional and community 
Governments, their central administrations, the public institutions that 
depend on them, i.e. most autonomous public bodies, at least as far as they 
have a public-law form as well as local governments and their satellite bodies 
in a public-law form37). Following a judgment of the Constitutional Court 
that discerned a discrimination in the overall exclusion of the legislature 
and the judiciary from the duty to give reasons, it is now accepted that the 
so-called ‘administrative’ acts of these institutions that can be challenged 
before the Council of State, are also subject to the duty to give reasons.38
20. In the Netherlands, the Awb applies to so called ‘bestuursorganen’ 
(administrative organs). A  general definition is found in Article 1:1 of 
the Awb. The criteria and exceptions enshrined in this provision are 
quite comparable to those that are applied in Belgium and comparable 
difficulties of interpretation have arisen.39 Bodies pertaining to the 
legislature or judiciary qualify as ‘bestuursorgaan’, if and to the extent that 
they take decisions or perform acts vis-à-vis civil servants.40
21. The French LMAA did not specify which state bodies are subject 
to the duties enshrined in it. It contained only a  delineation ratione 
materiae. Article L211–1 of the CRPA now mentions that the provisions on 
‘motivation’ apply to all administrations mentioned in Article L100–3, 1° of 
the Code. These include the state administration, the so-called ‘collectivités 
territoriales’ (the most important are the regions, departments, provinces 
and municipalities) and the autonomous public bodies that depend on 
them.41 The provisions also apply to organisations or persons responsible 
for a mission of public service that is of commercial or industrial nature, 
but only to the extent that these organisations or persons take decisions 
that relate to the execution of such missions. 
22. Article 296 of the TFEU applies to all institutions of the Union that 
fulfil either legislative or administrative tasks.42 As explained earlier, the 
37  Private-law bodies are only considered ‘administrative authorities’ and to the 
extent that they have been invested with ‘coercive powers vis-à-vis third parties.
38  See Article 14, §1, 2° RvS-Wet: this includes, inter alia, decisions with regard 
to sta or with regard to public procurement procedures, which are considered 
administrative rather than legislative or judiciary in nature. 
39  See e.g. S. E. Zijlstra, Bestuurlijk Organisatierecht, Kluwer 2009, p. 43–58.
40  See Article 1:1 (3) Awb: an exception is provided for civil servants with life tenure 
working for the Council of State or the General Chamber of Audits. 
41  ‘[Les] établissements publics administratifs et les organismes et personnes de droit 
public et de droit privé chargés d’une mission de service public administratif, y compris les 
organismes de sécurité sociale.’
42  See: Y. Benfquih, K. Deckers, D. Verhoeven, De motiveringsplicht…, p. 136, who 
refer to the old Articles 190 and (later) 253 of the former Treaty, where the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission were explicitly named. 
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duty to give reasons as an unwritten general principle of law has a broader 
scope and applies to the Member States whenever they implement EU law.43 
Schematic overview 
Scope ratione personae of the duty to give reasons as a (quasi) general obligation
Belgium and the 
Netherlands
Delineation via general notions (‘administratieve overheid’ resp. 
‘bestuursorgaan’) – these cover at least all traditional administrative 
bodies as well as those pertaining to the other state powers, if they 
take specific decisions of administrative nature. 
France Delineation via enumeration, which covers the administrations 
of the state and the territorial entities, (the most important 
categories of) autonomous public bodies and the organisations 
with commercial or industrial tasks to the extent that they take 
decisions embedded in a public service mission. 
EU All EU institutions that fulfil legislative or administrative 
tasks (Parliament, Council and Commission, as well as their 
administrations and satellite bodies) and the Member States that 
implement EU law. 
2. Which decisions fall within the scope of the duty to give reasons? 
(WHEN?)
a. The rule
23. In Belgium, the duty to give reasons only applies to (all) unilateral 
acts with an individual scope that aim to generate legal consequences for 
one or more legal subjects or for another administrative authority (Article 1 
of the WMB).44 The limitation to acts with an individual scope implies that 
normative or rule-making administrative acts (by-laws or regulations) do 
not fall within the scope of the WMB.45 Because the reasons have to be 
provided in the (text of the) administrative decision itself, the decision also 
has to be a written one. This implies that tacit or implicit administrative 
decisions46 fall outside the act’s scope. 
24. In France, providing a  statement of reasons for unilateral 
administrative acts is optional, except in those cases where an explicit legal 
43  Supra, para 12. 
44  An elaborate discussion is found in: I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, Toepassingsgebied 
ratione materiae van de wet motivering bestuurshandelingen, in: Formele motivering van 
bestuurshandelingen, I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet (eds.), die Keure 2013, p. 55–76.
45  is does not mean, of course, that these acts should not be inspired by correct, 
rational and reasonable justications. ese do not, however, have to be mentioned in 
the normative decision itself. e legal basis for this substantive duty to give reasons 
is a  general principle of administrative law. See e.g. RvS 28 June 2012, no. 220.035, 
Goutière. 
46  For instance: when a Flemish local government does not take a decision on an 
application for a building permit within the period prescribed by the Flemish Code on 
Urban Planning Law (Vlaamse Codex Ruimtelijke Ordening or VCRO), it is presumed that 
it has taken a negative decision. is negative decision can subsequently be challenged 
via an administrative appeal at the provincial level. See Article 4.7.18, § 2 VCRO. 
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provision or a principle developed in case law obliges the administration 
to give reasons.47 The most general, cross-sectorial obligation is found 
in the CRPA, which encompasses decisions of two different purports: 
‘ les decisions individuelles défavorables’ (Article L211-2 CRPA) and ‘ les 
decisions individuelles dérogatoires’ (Article L211-3 CRPA). 
As far as the first category is concerned, that of ‘unfavorable acts’, the act 
enshrines, however, a limited list of (types of) decisions that are subject to 
the duty to give reasons (Article 1). These include decisions that restrain the 
exercise of public liberties or, in a general way, constitute police measures 
(1), impose a  penalty (2), submit the granting of a  permit to restrictive 
conditions or impose constraints (3), revoke or repeal a  decision that 
creates rights (4), entail a prescription, a foreclosure or an expiration (5), 
refuse a benefit the granting of which constitutes a right for those persons 
who comply with the legal conditions to obtain it (6), refuse a  permit, 
except when the notification of the reasons could impair one of the secrets 
or interests protected by the provisions in the second to fifth paragraph 
of Article 6 of the Loi portant diverses mesures d’amélioration des relations 
entre l’administration et le public (7) or, finally, reject an administrative 
appeal that is obligatory prior to any judicial claim pursuant to a legislative 
or regulatory provision (8). 
The unfavorable nature of a decision has to be judged in relation to the 
(direct) addressee only and not in relation to other, third parties (implying 
that these persons cannot invoke a right to obtain a reasoned decision on 
the basis of these provisions).48 
As far as the second category is concerned, i.e. the individual 
administrative decisions that derogate from general rules in a statute or a by-
law, it should be noted that this covers favourable as well as unfavourable 
decisions.49 
This delineation ratione materiae implies that acts with a general scope 
(les actes réglementaires) and individual decisions that are favourable for 
those directly affected are not subject to the provisions on the duty to give 
reasons.50 The decisions named by the CRPA constitute an exhaustive 
47  Literature notes, however, that, considering the increase of legal dispositions 
imposing a  duty to state reasons, the time may have come to reverse the principle. 
See: O. Gabarda, Vers la généralisation…, p. 61–71. Both the French Conseil d’État and 
Conseil Constitutionnel have, however, rejected the recognition of a general principle 
that requires the administration to give reasons for its decisions: supra, footnote 4.
48  See e.g. Conseil d’État 30 décembre 2009, no. 297433, Emile Reilles: ‘[P]our 
l’application de cet article, l’appréciation du caractère défavorable d’une décision doit se 
faire en fonction des seules personnes physiques ou morales qui sont directement concernées 
par elle’. See the criticism in Olivier Gabarda, Vers la généralisation…, p. 61, 65. 
49  Articles L211-7 and L211-8 contain provisions on the duty to give reasons in the 
sphere of social security, i.e. specic to one branch of public law. ey are not discussed 
here. 
50  O. Gabarda, Vers la généralisation…, p. 61, 64. 
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and limitative list.51 Research by the French doctrine has revealed that the 
Conseil d’État gives a restrictive interpretation to the categories of decisions 
enumerated in the former LMAA, now in Articles L211-2 and L211-3 of 
the CRPA.52 
Pursuant to Article L211-4 CRPA, the so called décrets en Conseil d’État53 
can, if necessary, specify the categories of decisions that have to be reasoned 
in the application of the CRPA. Up until now, no such décrets have been 
issued.54 This has not prevented the French Prime Minister from issuing, 
however, soft law documents (circulaires) containing interpretations of the 
act in terms of its scope ratione materiae.55 The Conseil d’État has, however, 
ruled that these documents cannot be enforced vis-à-vis citizens, nor can 
they derive a right to a statement of reasons from them.56 It is the courts 
themselves and, in the end, the Conseil d’État as the highest administrative 
court, that has the final say on the interpretation of the law. This has given 
rise to an impressive amount of case law of a  ‘complex’ and ‘evolving’ 
nature57, of which even a rudimentary discussion falls outside the scope of 
this article.58
25. The Netherlands occupies an intermediate position. Here, the duty 
to give reasons, as it is currently conceived of in the Awb, applies to all 
written unilateral administrative decisions (‘besluiten’), except for the actual 
by-laws (‘algemeen verbindende voorschriften’), i.e. real normative acts, 
containing rules with a general scope.59 It does not, however, discriminate 
51  J.-L. Autin, La motivation…, p. 85, 93–94 with a reference to case law. 
52  Ibidem p. 97: ‘En dénitive, il s’avère que le Conseil d’Etat reste fermement attache 
à l’état du droit antérieur et limite au maximum la portée de la nouvelle législation, ce que 
déplore majoritairement la doctrine mais ce qui est conforme à l’idée que les exceptions 
à un principe, formulées par un texte législatif ou réglementaire, sont d’une interprétation 
stricte.’ See also: J.-Y. Vincent, G. Quillévéré, Fascicule 107–30: Motivation de l’acte 
administratif, in : JurisClasseur Administratif, LexisNexis, version of 28 June 2014, with 
updates until 1 July 2015, paras 11 and 23. 
53  Special regulatory acts, issued by the French Government, for which the Conseil 
d’État intervenes as an advisory body. 
54  J.-Y. Vincent, G. Quillévéré, Fascicule 107–30: Motivation…, para 25.
55  See the references in: O. Gabarda, Vers la généralisation…, p. 61, 64.
56  See: (the references in) M. Gros, Droit administratif…; J.-Y. Vincent, G. Quillévéré, 
Fascicule 107–30: Motivation…, para 26.
57  J-L. Autin, La motivation…, p. 85, 96.
58  Literature speaks of ‘l’appréciation prétorienne du champ d’application de la 
motivation’. See: M. Gros, Droit administratif…, p. 142–148. An extensive overview 
of interpretative case law is found in: J.-Y. Vincent, G. Quillévéré, Fascicule 107–30: 
Motivation…, paras 27–88.
59  See Article 3:1 (1) b of the Awb. Just like in Belgium (supra, footnote 46), these 
acts have to be reasoned pursuant to a  general principle of administrative law that 
requires all decisions to be based on sound grounds. It helps the courts to determine 
whether the (regulatory) act has been adopted with a reasonable goal. See: J. A. Damen, 
J. L. Boxum, K. J. de Graaf et al., Bestuursrecht (1) Deel I, Boom Juridische Uitgevers 
2009, p. 380; H. F. T. Pennarts, Beginselen van…, p. 64 with references to case law. See also 
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between quasi-normative decisions (such as the so called ‘policy rules’ or 
‘beleidsregels’) and individual, adjudicatory, administrative acts. In order 
to qualify as a  ‘besluit’, a decision has to be written.60 The provisions on 
the duty to give reasons anchored in the Awb consequently do not apply to 
tacit or implicit decisions. 
26. The EU differs substantially from the three domestic systems 
studied here – and from most other national European systems of public 
law for that matter61 – since the duty to give reasons in Article 296 of 
the TFEU extends to legislative acts as well. The case law of the ECJ has 
more generally revealed that all (unilateral) acts that (can) generate legal 
consequences fall within the scope of the duty to state reasons. This 
means that all acts that qualify for judicial review under Article 263 of 
the TFEU are subject to this duty.62 Most authors who write on the duty 
to give reasons in EU law depart from a  dichotomy, i.e. the distinction 
between individual decisions on the one hand and legislative documents, 
i.e. directives and regulations, on the other hand. There is, however, 
a  third category of decisions that is often forgotten: that of subordinate 
legislation or by-laws. These are binding normative acts that are not 
issued by the legislative branch, but by the executive in the person of the 
European Commission.63 The basis for these ‘quasi-legislative’ powers is 
found in Articles 290 and 291 of the TFEU. A distinction is made between 
‘delegated measures/acts’ on the one hand and ‘implementing measures/
acts’ on the other.64 Literature has established that the a large number of 
Article 118 of the Directions for Legislation, applicable to administrative regulations as 
well and binding for civil servants who prepare legislative dra s in the Netherlands: the 
preamble has to mention the reason behind the enactment of the regulation. 
60  Pursuant to Article 1:3 of the Awb, a‘besluit’ is a written decision issued by an 
administrative organ, containing a legal act of public law nature.
61  P. Craig, EU administrative…, p. 341.
62  Case C-370/07 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the 
European Union, 2009, ECR I-08917, recital 42: the duty to give reasons ‘which is 
justied in particular by the need for the Court to be able to exercise judicial review, 
must apply to all acts which may be the subject of an action for annulment.’
63  It is assumed that EU agencies, which also pertain to the EU executive, cannot 
be entrusted with rule-making powers, pursuant to the Meroni doctrine. See e.g. 
M. Chamon, EU agencies: does the Meroni Doctrine make sense?, “Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law” 2010, vol. 17, issue 3, p. 281.
64  ‘Delegated measures are to be used to amend or supplement non-essential 
elements of legislation’, whereas ‘implementing measures are to provide greater 
uniformity to the application and implementation of EU legislation by setting out in 
greater detail its implications, be this through further rules or individual decisions’: 
D. Chambers, G. Davies, G. Monti, European Union Law, Cambridge University Press 
2014, p. 68. Implementing acts are not necessarily normative in scope. e power to 
take implementing measures can also, under certain circumstances, be conferred on 
the Council (Article 291(2) of the TFEU). 
112
The Duty to Give Reasons in the European Legal Area… RAP 2016 (2)
these instruments has been issued over the past years.65 They adopt the 
names of ordinary legislative instruments, with addition of the adjectives 
‘delegated’ or ‘implementing’ (e.g. ‘delegated directive’). Evidently, these 
acts can be challenged before the EU courts, which makes them subject to 
the duty to give reasons. 
27. The further definition of the types of decisions that fall within 
the scope of the duty to give reasons has mostly taken place within and 
is often specific to the various sub-sectors of EU law. Schwarze notes, 
for instance, that, in competition law, the Court has ruled that only legal 
acts that conclude competition proceedings have to be reasoned, not the 
preparatory measures.66 
Schematic overview 
Scope ratione materiae of the duty to give reasons as a (quasi) general obligation
Belgium Open system comprising all unilateral acts with 
an individual scope that aim to generate legal 
consequences for one or more legal subjects or 
for another administrative authority.
Implicit decisions 
excluded.
France Closed system comprising two types of 
unilateral acts with an individual scope: 
‘decisions individuelles défavorables’ and 
‘decisions individuelles dérogatoires’.
Special regime for 
implicit decisions 
(infra, para 30).
The Netherlands Open system comprising all written unilateral 
administrative acts, except for by-laws.
Implicit decisions 
excluded.
EU Open system comprising all unilateral acts that 
(can) generate legal consequences, whether their 
scope is legislative, regulatory or individual. 
Not applicable.
b. Exceptions to the rule
28. The Belgian WMB provides a  limitative list of exceptions to the 
rule of giving reasons for individual administrative acts. The duty does not 
apply if the statement of reasons: 
1° jeopardizes the external security of the State; 
2° has the potential of disturbing the public order:
3° risks detracting from the respect for a person’s private life; 
4° risks detracting from provisions imposing a duty of silence. 
As exceptions to a guarantee that offers legal protection to citizens, these 
grounds have to be interpreted narrowly.67 Pursuant to Article 5 of the 
65  D. Chambers, G. Davies, G. Monti, European…, p. 68. See also the discussion in: 
H. C. H. Hofmann, G. C. Rowe, A. H. Türk, Administrative Law…, p. 524–535.
66  J. Schwarze, European…, p. 1409 with reference to case law. See also p. 1404–
1405 on the question whether acts in the sphere of contracts have to be reasoned and 
p. 1407–1409 on sta matters. 
67  I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, Uitzonderingen op de formele motiveringsplicht, in: 
Formele motivering van bestuurshandelingen, (eds.) I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, die Keure 
2013, p. 77, 79 and the references there.
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WMB, urgent necessity does not constitute an exception: in this situation, 
administrative authorities are still obliged to comply with all requirements 
prescribed by the act.68 
29. This approachcontrasts with Article 3:47 of the Dutch Awb, which 
provides the possibility for the administration not to provide reasons 
immediately, when the decision is notified, but to do so later, within 
a week after the notification, if this is necessary for reasons of urgency. 
Furthermore, Article 3:48 Awb provides that the statement of reasons 
can be omitted if it can be reasonably assumed that there is no need for 
it. If an interested party nonetheless makes a request for reasons within 
a  reasonable period of time, then those have to be provided as soon as 
possible. This primarily applies to favourable decisions that do not involve 
the rights of third parties.69
30. In France, the list of decisions that are subject to the duty to give 
reasons enshrined in Article L211-2 of the CRPA already contains at least 
one exception or restriction: decisions denying a  permit do not require 
a statement of reasons when this could impair one of the secrets or interests 
protected by Article L311-5, 2°, a-f of the CRPA.70 Subsequently, Article 
L211-6 of the CRPA stipulates that if absolute urgency has prevented 
compliance with the duty to provide reasons, this does not entail the 
illegality of the act. However, if an interested party asks for the statement 
of reasons to be communicated to him/her, within the period available 
to initiate a  procedure for judicial review, the authority that has made 
the decision will have to comply with this request, within a period of one 
month. Pursuant to the last paragraph of Article L211-6, the provisions of 
the law moreover do not derogate from the legislative texts that prohibit 
the disclosure of the publication of facts protected by (a duty of) secrecy.71 
Article L232-4 of the CRPA contains a balanced solution for the lack of 
reasons in a tacit or implicit decision. If such an implicit decision covers one 
of the situations anchored in Article 1 or 2 of the act, it does not become 
illegal because of the mere fact that it does not contain reasons. However, if 
an interested party requests reasons for an implicit negative decision within 
the period available to start a  procedure for judicial review, this request 
should be granted within a month. In this case, the period available to start 
a procedure for judicial review against this decision will be extended until 
two months after the day on which the reasons are communicated to the 
interested party. 
68  See: Ibidem, 77–100 for a full discussion of the relevant case law with regard to 
the scope and interpretation of the exceptions. 
69  G. A. C. M. van Ballegooij, T. Barkhuysen, W. den Ouden en J. E. M. Polak, 
Bestuursrecht in het Awb-tijdperk, Kluwer 2008, p. 96.
70  is includes, for instance, national defence policy. 
71  See: J.-Y. Vincent, G. Quillévéré, Fascicule 107–30: Motivation…, p. 90–91.
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Literature emphasises that the courts give a strict interpretation to these 
exceptions. If the administration wishes to rely on the duty of secrecy, the 
courts assess whether the duty to give reasons would truly affect the duty of 
secrecy. As far as the exception based on urgency is concerned, a study of 
the case law reveals ‘une apprehension extrêmement restrictive’.72
31. As far as the EU is concerned, doctrinal research has revealed that 
EU law does not know any real exceptions to the duty to give reasons, in 
the same way the national systems studied do. There are, however, certain 
situations in which the extent of the duty to give reasons is tempered 
or moderated. This is the case, for instance, when the interested party 
was involved in the decision-making process in a  way that has allowed 
him/her to be informed about the reasons behind the result.73 The duty 
of professional secrecy74 and the fact that the time available to reach 
a  decision is limited75 may also influence the scope of the duty to give 
reasons.76 However, ‘the Court is conscious of avoiding the hollowing out 
of the obligation to provide reasons on the basis of claims regarding the 
need for secrecy, speaking of the need to preserve the ‘essential content’ of 
the requirements to give reasons.’77
In a more recent case concerning the lack of any mention of a legal basis 
on which the Council had deemed it justifiable to act – a requirement that 
is taken very seriously by the Court (supra) – the Court refused to accept 
the justification of time pressure.78 ‘Consequently, the Court is careful 
not to let practical objections be decisive when it comes to fundamental 
constitutional principles’, a case note concluded.79 The Court has, however, 
accepted that other practical impediments may influence the contents of 
the duty to give reasons, acknowledging that, for certain80 decisions ‘[t]
72  M. Gros, Droit administratif…, p. 152. See also: J.-Y. Vincent, G. Quillévéré, 
Fascicule 107–30: Motivation…, p. 101. 
73  See the discussion and the references in : Y. Benfquih, K. Deckers, D. Verhoeven, 
De motiveringsplicht in het Europees bestuursrecht’, (2012) 3 TBP 136, 146–147. 
74  Ibid, with reference to Case 121/76, Alessandro Moli v Commission of the European 
Communities, [1977] ECR 1971. 
75  Ibidem, with various references. 
76  See also the other examples given in: Y. Benfquih, K. Deckers, D. Verhoeven, De 
motiveringsplicht…, p. 136, 143. 
77  H. C. H. Hofmann, G. C. Rowe, A. H. Türk, Administrative Law…, p. 202 with 
a reference to Case 89/79 Bonu v Council, 1980, ECR 553; Joined cases 296 and 318/82 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek BV v Commission, 
1985, ECR 809. In the latter case, the Court suggested that ‘the Commission could 
have excluded from publication those facts which it considered to be covered by the 
obligation of professional secrecy’ (recital 28). 
78  Case C-370/07 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the 
European Union, 2009, ECR I-08917, recital 53.
79  Geert De Baere, case note Case C-370/07 [2010] SEW 477, 480.
80  ose that require substantial assessments, consisting of various calculations and 
depending on a variety of parameters and/or facts, which are therefore complex and 
technical in nature. 
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he degree of precision of the statement of reasons […] must be weighed 
against practical realities and the time and technical facilities available for 
making such a decision.’81
Finally, it should be noted that Article 52(1) provides for a possibility 
to limit the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter, 
as long as these are provided by law and respect the essence of those rights 
and freedoms. ‘Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may 
be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general 
interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others.’ 
Schematic overview 
Exceptions to the duty to give reasons as a (quasi) general obligation
Belgium Four exceptions in WMB; restrictive interpretation:
1° external safety;
2° public order;
3° private life;
4° duty of silence.
Urgency does not constitute an exception.
The Netherlands Two exceptions in the Awb: 
1° no need for reasons
2° urgency, albeit with a corrective mechanism. 
France Three exceptions in the CRPA, restrictive interpretation: 
1° protected secrets,
2° absolute urgency, albeit with a corrective mechanism and
3° tacit decisions, albeit with a corrective mechanism. 
EU No real exceptions, only situations in which the duty is tempered.
Urgency (time pressure) will not be (easily) accepted.
D. The purport of the duty to give reasons (HOW?)
32. Once a  decision is subject to the duty to give reasons, what are 
the implications of this obligation? Which requirements characterise this 
duty? 
1. Time and place of the statement of reasons
33. In Belgium, the reasons for the decision have to be mentioned in 
the (written) decision itself (Article 3 of the WMB). It is not sufficient that 
they are mentioned in the letter of notification, since this does not always 
allow the court to be sure that the competent authority, i.e. the same as the 
one that has taken the actual decision, has also provided the reasons.82 The 
statement of reasons cannot be contained in any other document that is 
81  Case C-15/65, Schwarze v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 
1965, ECR 1081; Jürgen Schwarze, European…, p. 1409.
82  RvS 10 December 2010, no. 209.565, De Dobbeleer; I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, 
Draagwijdte van de formele motiveringsplicht, in: Formele motivering van bestuurshan-
delingen, (eds) I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, die Keure 2013, p. 129, 130 .
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issued after the decision has been notified either, especially not in one that 
is first submitted or revealed at the stage of judicial review. 
34. In France, as a rule, the reasons are provided in the same text as 
the actual decision, but it has been accepted that they are part of a letter 
attached to the decision as well, as long as they are notified simultaneously.83 
The essential precondition is, of course, that the interested party is aware 
of the existence of the (separate) document that contains the reasons.84 The 
Courts do not accept a notification of reasons either after the decision has 
been notified or before the (actual and final) decision has been notified (‘la 
motivation anticipée’).85 Note that there is an exception, however, for cases 
of absolute urgency (supra). 
35. The Dutch Awb (Article 3:47) stipulates that the reasons have to be 
provided together with the notification of the decision. This implies that 
the decision and the statement of reasons do not have to be part of the same 
text, but have to be notified simultaneously. The reasons may, for instance, 
be mentioned in a  separate letter, attached to the actual decision.86 As 
mentioned earlier, Article 3:47 of the Awb provides for an exception to this 
rule in cases of urgency. The need to apply this provision may, for instance, 
be felt in legal enforcement cases, where quick action is required.87 Infra, 
it will be explained that the technique of the ‘administrative loop’ in 
the Netherlands allows for a  lack of reason-giving or deficiencies in the 
statement of reasons to be ‘repaired’ in the course of an administrative 
appeal or a judicial procedure. This means that (a part of) the statement of 
reasons will only be notified at a later stage. Literature notes, however, that 
the legal basis of the decision cannot be (essentially) changed in the course 
of such a procedure.88 The Courts will not annul a decision on the grounds 
that the statement of reasons was not notified together with the decision, 
but only at a later stage, if the applicant’s interests were not affected by this 
deficiency.89
36. In the EU, it follows from the formulation of Article 297 of the TFEU 
that ‘in general, the statement of reasons will share the same form as the 
legal act to which it refers, because both are intimately linked together’.90 
83  P.-L. Frier, J. Petit, Droit…, p. 350 with references to the case law of the Conseil 
d’État. 
84  N. Songolo, La motivation des actes administratifs, Village de la Justice. La 
communaute des metiers du droit; http://www.village-justice.com/articles/motivation-
actes-administratifs,10849.html (10.02.2015).
85  See: M. Gros, Droit administratif…, p. 148 with various references to the case law 
of the Conseil d’État; J.-Y. Vincent, Guy Quillévéré, Fascicule 107–30: Motivation…, 
paras 114–116.
86  H. F. T. Pennarts, Beginselen van…, p. 52–53.
87  R. J. N. Schlössels, S. E. Zijlstra, Bestuursrecht…, p. 464. 
88  Ibidem 464 with references to case law and literature. 
89  Ibidem, p. 464.
90  Jürgen Schwarze, European…, p. 1405 with references. 
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This implies that the statement of reasons must be issued at the same time 
as the decision.91 The case law of the ECJ has clarified that this means: in 
the (text of) the act itself.92 Just like in Belgium, it is not sufficient that 
the reasons are mentioned in a later, related act.93 A fortiori, ‘a failure to 
state the reasons cannot be remedied by the fact that the person concerned 
learns the reasons for the decision during the proceedings before the 
Court’.94 The same is true more generally for written or oral explanations 
given after the appeal before the court has already been filed.95
It should be noted that the reasons for acts of a legislative or normative 
nature will typically be mentioned in the recitals of the preamble, which, in 
EU law, is part of the same text as the act itself. 
37. In all the systems studied, one important exception exists with 
regard to the rule of notification in the decision or its notification. The 
legislature and/or the courts accept that the administration, in its decision, 
refers to what has previously been stated in another written piece that 
was part of the administrative process: i.e. reason giving through referral. 
Typically, these documents are advisory in nature. 
38. In the Netherlands, Article 3:49 of the Awb stipulates that reference 
to an advisory opinion that was issued in view of an administrative decision 
suffices as a statement of reasons, if the advisory document itself contains 
the reasons and if it was or will be notified. The courts have added to 
this provision an additional requirement: it is up to the administration 
to verify whether and to what extent the opinion is sound or valid, i.e. 
the ‘vergewisplicht’ or ‘duty to ascertain’. The advisory procedure and 
the result have to be free from flaws, both formally (the composition and 
functioning of the advisory body) and substantively (the contents of the 
opinion). The latter means that the advisory opinion itself has to comply 
with the requirement of ‘soundness’ of the reasons in Article 3:46 of the 
Awb (infra).96 
39. The Belgian Council of State has acknowledged, in its case law, that 
reason-giving by reference to other documents (typically a preparatory act, 
such as an advisory opinion) is possible, if the following requirements have 
been (cumulatively) fulfilled: (1) the content of the piece to which reference 
91  Ibidem, p. 1406.
92  See e.g. Case C-291/98 P Sarrió v Commission, 2000, ECR I-9991, recitals 73 
and 75.
93  E.g. Case C-370/07 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the 
European Union, 2009, ECR I-8917, recital 53. 
94  E.g. Case C-195/80 Michel v Parliament, 1981, ECR-2861, recital 22; Joined cases 
T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94 European Night Services Ltd (ENS) and 
Others v Commission, 1998, ECR II-3141. 
95  E.g. Case T-349/03 Corsica Ferries France v Commission, 2005, ECR II-2197, 
recital 287.
96  G. A. C. M. van Ballegooij, T. Barkhuysen, W. den Ouden en J. E. M. Polak, 
Bestuursrecht…, p. 96.
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is made has to be notified to the person affected by the decision, (2) the 
piece to which reference is made has to comply with the requirement of 
‘adequacy’, enshrined in Article 3 of the WMB (infra) itself, (3) the decision 
has to agree with the document to which reference is made and (4) there may 
be no contradictory opinions.97 Denys had derived a fifth, more implicit 
condition from the case law; the opinions referred to have to comply, 
both formally and substantively, with the requirements of due diligence, 
as a  principle of good administration (‘zorgvuldigheidsbeginsel’).98 This 
condition is comparable to the above-mentioned ‘duty to ascertain’ upheld 
in the Netherlands, since it is up to the final decision-maker to verify 
whether the act complies with these standards.
40. In France, the administrative courts have acknowledged, albeit 
exceptionally, that a statement of reasons can be construed via a reference 
to other documents.99 The case law of the Conseil d’État reveals that this 
is only possible, if the conclusions of these documents themselves comply 
with the legal requirements on the duty to give reasons and if the final 
decision-maker agrees with the conclusions (of, for instance, the advisory 
document) and makes them his own.100 Reference to a document that itself 
refers to another document containing the reasons behind its content or 
conclusions is not valid: renvoi sur renvoi ne vaut.101 
41. The ECJ accepts references to an earlier (individual) act that 
contains the grounds on which other, later (individual) decisions are 
based.102 Craig derives from this case law that ‘[w]hen a decision established 
a new principle, or applied it in a novel fashion, there would have to be 
sufficient reasons in the decision itself, but on some occasions the Court 
will sanction the incorporation of reasons from another instrument’103. 
Reference to vague documents, such as invoices that cannot be precisely 
identified, does not suffice.104
97  I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, Draagwijdte…, p. 129, 133–134 with multiple reference 
to the constant case law. For a recent example, see: RvS 13 March 2004, no. 226.734, de 
NV Baeck & Jansen. 
98  See (the references in): S. Denys, Advisering in het bestuursrecht, Administratieve 
rechtsbibliotheek: algemene reeks, die Keure, Brugge 2013, p. 839–987.
99  E.g. Conseil d’État 9 novembre 1984, no. 44983, comité dauphinois d’hygiène 
industrielle; O. Gabarda, Vers la généralisation…, p. 61, 64. Contra: M. Gros, Droit 
administratif…, p. 149 referring to Conseil d’État 17 juin 1983, no. 28115, X.
100  See the references in: J.-Y. Vincent, G. Quillévéré, Fascicule 107–30: Motivation…, 
p. 109. 
101  Ibidem.
102  Case C-16/65 Schwarze, 1965, ECR 1081. See also e.g. Case C-119/97 P Ufex and 
Others v Commission, 1999,  ECR I-1341, recital 57: ‘[T]he statement of reasons for an 
administrative act may refer to other acts and, in particular, take note of the content of 
an earlier act, especially if it is connected.’ 
103  P. Craig, EU administrative…, p. 342 with reference to Case C-16/65.
104  Case T-306/00 Conserve Italia v Commission, 2003, II-5705, recital 55, cited in: 
Y. Benfquih, K. Deckers, D. Verhoeven, De motiveringsplicht…, p. 136, 151.
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Schematic overview 
Time and place of the statement of reasons
Belgium and EU In the act itself. Reference to advisory documents 
or other documents allowed under 
conditions. 
France and  
The Netherlands
– Notification 
simultaneously with the 
act; in the act itself or in an 
accompanying letter. 
– Exceptional arrangement 
in cases of urgency. 
Reference to advisory documents 
or other documents allowed under 
conditions.
2. Content of the statement of reasons
a. General requirements
As to the actual content of the duty to give reasons, the Belgian 
WMB prescribes that the decision should mention the legal and factual 
considerations underlying the decision. It furthermore requires an 
‘adequate’ (afdoende / adéquat(e)) statement of reasons (Article 3). This 
means that, first of all, the decision should mention the legal grounds 
on the basis of which it has been taken (the relevant statute, by-law,…). 
Moreover, the facts that have given rise to or are relevant to the decision 
have to be made explicit. Whether a statement of reasons is ‘adequate’ is 
in turn evaluated on the basis of two sub-criteria. First of all, the courts 
will assess whether it has sufficient ‘carrying capacity’: can it truly support 
the decision in its full scope? This will only be the case if the reasons are 
clear, correct, pertinent, non-contradictory, specific and precise; standard 
formulations are out of the question. Second of all, the statement of reasons 
has to be ‘proportionate’ in relation to the importance of the decision as 
well as the degree to which it involves a discretionary assessment. 
Research has revealed that these criteria and sub-criteria have given rise 
to an impressive amount of case law, issued by the Council of State, the 
various special administrative courts and – in some cases – the civil courts. 
Naturally, they require a case-by-case assessment, meaning that compliance 
is highly dependent on the specific circumstances of the case.105
42. In the Netherlands, a distinction is made between (the qualitative 
requirements that govern) the notification and possibility for the parties 
addressed to know the reasons (‘kenbaarheid’) of the decision on the 
one hand and (those that govern) the substantive capacity (‘draagkracht 
105  For an elaborate overview, see: I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, Draagwijdte…, p. 129, 
141 . 
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(igheid)’) of the reasons106 provided on the other hand.107 These correspond 
to the formal and substantive aspect of the duty to provide reasons 
respectively. 
The formal pillar of the duty to give reasons implies that the statement 
of reasons is sufficiently clear. Cryptic or incomprehensible considerations 
hamper both the formal and substantive requirement of the duty to give 
reasons.108 
As far as the substantive aspect is concerned, Article 3:46 of the Awb 
prescribes that an administrative decision has to be underpinned by 
a ‘sound’ (‘deugdelijke’) statement of reasons. According to legal doctrine, 
this means that the decision has to be ‘carried by rational and consistent 
considerations’, that the reasons must carry the administrative act ‘factually 
and logically’ and that the arguments mentioned should have ‘sufficient 
weight to justify the decision’.109 Other literature mentions the values of 
consistency, conclusiveness and intelligibility as relevant criteria. A lack of 
internal contradictions, of a refutation of argument brought forward by the 
addressee in the course of the administrative process110 or of an explanation 
why an advisory opinion was not followed, are examples of deficiencies that 
violate the requirement of soundness.111 Another important requirement 
is that the statement of reasons has to be sufficiently specific and tailored 
to the decision.112 ‘Considerations that are true in general, without any 
indication why they would also be valid in the case at hand, are insufficient. 
The same is true if a merely formal statement of reasons is provided that 
abstracts from the facts.’113 Nevertheless, the statement of reasons can 
106  J. A. Damen, J. L. Boxum, K. J. de Graaf et al., Bestuursrecht (1) Deel I, Boom 
Juridische Uitgevers 2009, p. 380. 
107  R. J. N. Schlössels, S. E. Zijlstra, Bestuursrecht in de sociale rechtsstaat, Kluwer 
2010, p. 463; G. A. C. M. van Ballegooij, T. Barkhuysen, W. den Ouden en J. E. M. Polak, 
Bestuursrecht in het Awb-tijdperk, Kluwer 2008, p. 95–96; H. F. T. Pennarts, Beginselen 
van behoorlijk bestuur, Maklu 2008, p. 52.
108  R. J. N. Schlössels, S. E. Zijlstra, Bestuursrecht in…, p. 466. See also: 
G. A. C. M. van Ballegooij, T. Barkhuysen, W. den Ouden en J. E. M. Polak, Bestuursrecht 
in…, p. 96.
109  R. J. N. Schlössels, S. E. Zijlstra, Bestuursrecht in…, p. 463.
110  See also: H. F. T. Pennarts, Beginselen van…, p. 54; J. A. Damen, J. L. Boxum, 
K. J. de Graaf et al., Bestuursrecht (1) Deel I, Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2009, p. 433.
111  J. A. Damen, J. L. Boxum, K. J. de Graaf et al., Bestuursrecht (1) Deel I, Boom 
Juridische Uitgevers 2009, p. 380–381 with multiple references. 
112  R. J. N. Schlössels, S. E. Zijlstra, Bestuursrecht in…, p. 466. 
113  H. F. T. Pennarts, Beginselen van…, p. 54. Other examples of deciencies that 
aect the statement of reasons substantively are: the lack of, the insuciency or the 
incorrectness of facts; the lack of an assessment of (relevant) interests; the applicable 
law, policy rules or policy is not mentioned at all or is mentioned incorrectly; the legal 
qualication is incorrect; the arguments of interested parties are not addressed or are 
addressed insuciently or incorrectly; the statement of reasons is contrary to the law; 
the statement of reasons is inconsistent or inconclusive (H. F. T. Pennarts, Beginselen 
van…, p. 55–57, based on analysis of the case law). 
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be more concise in the case of large amounts of routine decisions (the 
so-called ‘decision factory’) than in the case of stand-alone and unique 
decisions (‘decision studio’).114 Yet another text book warns, however, that 
it is impossible for the legislature to define ‘soundness’ for each and every 
situation. Therefore, case-by-case analysis is always necessary.115
Another substantive requirement for the duty to give reasons anchored 
in Article 3:47(2) reads that the decision ‘as much as possible’ mentions the 
statutory provision pursuant to which the decision has been made. 
43. The French CRPA prescribes that the statement of reasons has to be 
written and has to include an account of the legal and factual considerations 
that constitute the foundation of the decision.116 Abstract reasons will not 
be accepted; the decision has to be based on precise and circumstantial 
facts and has to consider the case and the personal situation of the affected 
party.117 The statement of reasons has to be sufficiently detailed (concise 
and complete at the same time118) and has to avoid formulaic wording 
(‘ formulaires-types’).119 
44. Article 296 of the TFEU obliges the EU institutions to refer, in their 
statement of reasons, to ‘any proposals, initiatives, recommendations, 
requests or opinion required by the Treaties’. Pursuant to the settled case 
law of the ECJ120, moreover, the statement of reasons:
must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a  clear and 
unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted 
the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to 
ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community 
court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the 
statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular 
the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the 
114  R. J. N. Schlössels, S. E. Zijlstra, Bestuursrecht in…, p. 465 with multiple references. 
In the same sense: J. A.  Damen, J. L. Boxum, K. J. de Graaf et al., Bestuursrecht (1) 
Deel I, Boom Juridische Uitgevers 2009, p. 433.
115  G. A. C. M. van Ballegooij, T. Barkhuysen, W. den Ouden, J. E. M. Polak, 
Bestuursrecht in…, p. 95. See also: R. J. N. Schlössels, S. E. Zijlstra, Bestuursrecht in…, 
p. 465, and J. A. Damen, J. L. Boxum, K. J. de Graaf et al., Bestuursrecht (1) Deel I, Boom 
Juridische Uitgevers 2009, p. 432, 464: the authors note that ‘giving reasons is custom 
work’.
116  Article L211–5.
117  O. Gabarda, Vers la généralisation…, p. 61, 64. In the same sense: N. Songolo, La 
motivation des actes administratifs, Village de la Justice. La communaute des maetiers du 
droit; http://www.village-justice.com/articles/motivation-actes-administratifs,10849.
html (10.02.2015).
118  J.-Y. Vincent, G. Quillévéré, Fascicule 107–30: Motivation…, p. 108.
119  M. Gros, Droit administratif…, p. 149–150 with references to the case law of the 
Conseil d’État. See also: J.-Y. Vincent, G. Quillévéré, Fascicule 107–30: Motivation…, 
p. 108. 
120  Case C-367/95 Sytraval and Brink’s France v Commission, 1998, ECR I-1719, 
recital 52 (emphasis added), cited by P. Craig, EU administrative…, p. 341.
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interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of 
direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not 
necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, 
since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements 
of Article 190121 of the Treaty must be assessed with regard not only to its 
wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter 
in question […].
Literature stresses that the extent of the duty to give reasons requires 
determination ‘on the basis of the particular facts of each case’.122 
According to Craig, the statement of reasons (in any case) has to contain 
a ‘specification of the Treaty article on which the measure was based; the 
factual background to the measure; and the purposes behind it’.123 However, 
‘[t]he context in which individual decisions are taken will be important in 
determining the extent of the duty to give reasons.’ In competition law, for 
instance, it has been acknowledged that ‘the Commission is not obliged to 
adopt a position on all the arguments relied on by the parties. It is sufficient 
if it sets out the facts and legal considerations having decisive importance 
for the decision.’124
Because of the institutional nature of the EU, i.e. a supranational order 
that has no other competences or powers than those granted by the Treaties, 
the duty for the EU institutions to mention the legal basis of an act is 
a particularly important aspect of the statement of reasons. ‘[T]he failure of 
to refer to a precise provision of the Treaty need not necessarily constitute 
an infringement of essential procedural requirements if the legal basis for 
a measure may be determined from other parts of the measure. However, 
such explicit reference is indispensable where, in its absence, the parties 
concerned and the Court are left uncertain as to the precise legal basis.’125
Some authors argue that, in the EU, the ability of the reasons to carry 
the decision, i.e. their lawfulness, relevance and reasonableness, is not 
121  Now Article 296. 
122  H. C. H. Hofmann, G. C. Rowe, A. H. Türk, Administrative Law…, p. 202 with 
references. See also: J. Schwarze, European…, p. 1406: ‘In principle, it is the case that 
the statement of reasons, which must be in the form laid down for the legal act, must 
contain the considerations of fact and law which determined the decision. e Court 
of Justice has, however, articulated a  series of points which in individual cases will 
determine the scope of the necessary statement of reasons.’
123  P. Craig, EU administrative…, p. 342 with references to the case law. 
124  Ibidem, 343. See e.g. Case T-5/93 Tremblay v Commission 1995 ECR II-185, 
recital 29.
125  Case C-370/07 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the 
European Union 2009 ECR I-8917, recital 56; see also the case note by: G. De Baere in 
2010 SEW 477 ; D. Keyaerts, Behoorlijke wetgeving in de rechtspraak van het Hof van 
Justitie 2008–2009, 2 TVW 2010, p. 103, 116; K. Lenaerts, P. Van Nuel, Europees recht, 
Intersentia 2011, p. 81. 
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usually considered as an aspect of the duty to give reasons, but there are 
exceptions.126
Finally, the EU Commission’s Code of Good Administrative Behaviour 
mentions the following with regard to the standard of reason-giving: 
A Commission decision should clearly state the reasons on which it is based and 
should be communicated to the persons and parties concerned. As a general 
rule full justification for decisions should be given. However, where it may not 
be possible, for example because of the large number of persons concerned 
by similar decisions, to communicate in detail the grounds of individual 
decisions, standard replies may be given. These standard replies should include 
the principal reasons justifying the decision taken. Furthermore, an interested 
party who expressly requests a detailed justification shall be provided with it.
Given the high standards upheld in the case law of the ECJ, it is doubtful 
whether this flexible and lenient approach, if applied in practice, would 
survive judicial scrutiny. 
b. The (relevance of the) distinction between decisions with an individual 
and general scope
45. This dichotomy is (only) relevant in the context of the EU, where 
legislative and other normative acts fall within the scope of the duty to 
give reasons. It should be noted, however, that, like most legal systems127, 
the EU struggles with the precise delineation of ‘regulatory’, ‘normative’ 
or ‘rule-making’ acts or decisions with a general scope vis-à-vis measures 
with an individual scope. For instance, it has been argued that some ‘acts 
of general application’, such as anti-dumping acts, may directly affect 
individuals, implying that a stricter standard will be applied in terms of 
reason-giving.128
46. It is clear from the case law of the ECJ that the standard against 
which the statement of reasons is tested is stricter in the case of decisions 
with an individual scope, compared with those of general nature.129 In one 
of its milestone judgments, the Court has ruled that:
The extent of the requirement laid down by Article 190 of the Treaty to state the 
reasons on which measures are based, depends on the nature of the measure 
in question. 
126  J. H. Jans, R. de Lange, S. Prechal, R. J. G. M. Widdershoven, Inleiding tot 
het Europees Bestuursrecht, Ars Aequi Libri 2002, p. 247 with reference to (as far 
as the exception is concerned) Case T-37/92 BEUC and NCC v Commission 1994 
ECR II-285, recitals 43 . 
127  For France, see e.g. J.-Y. Vincent, Guy Quillévéré, Fascicule 107–30: Motivation…, 
p. 33.
128  H. C. H. Hofmann, G. C. Rowe, A. H. Türk, Administrative Law…, p. 200. See 
also: J. Schwarze, European…, p. 1414 with references. 
129  Case C-18/62 Barge v High Authority, 1963 ECR 531; J. Schwarze, European 
administrative law (Sweet and Maxwell 2006) 1406 (see also p. 1412). 
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It is a question in the present case of a regulation, that is so to say, a measure 
intended to have general application, the preamble to which may be confined 
to indicating the general situation which led to its adoption, on the one hand, 
and the general objectives which it is intended to achieve on the other. 
Consequently, it is not possible to require that it should set out the various 
facts, which are often very numerous and complex, on the basis of which 
the regulation was adopted, or a fortiori that it should provide a more or less 
complete evaluation of those facts.130
Craig notes that ‘[w]here a measure was of a general legislative nature 
it was necessary for the EU authority to show the reasoning which led to its 
adoption, but it was not necessary for it to go into every point of fact and 
law. Where the essential objective of the measure had been clearly disclosed 
there was no need for a specific statement of the reasons for each of the 
technical choices that had been made.’131 ‘The Court may well demand gre-
ater particularity where the measure challenged is of an individual, rather 
than a legislative nature,’ the author continues.132
Schwarze warns, however, not to take the duty to give reasons for 
legislative acts all too lightly, since it ‘ensures that a certain level of publicity 
is given to the motives of the legislature’:
[T]he reasoning of normative acts in Community law must not be reduced 
to a  formality, since, given the secrecy of the deliberations of the Council 
and Commission, the institutions which are called upon to apply the law rely 
very heavily upon detailed information about the meaning and purpose of 
a regulation in order to effect an appropriate interpretation of its provisions.133
Finally, the Court has accepted that the statement of reasons for a leg-
islative act, in casu a regulation, ‘must be considered and assessed in the 
context of the complex of regulations of which this act is an integral part’.134
c. The relevance of the (degree of) discretionary power involved
47. In Belgium, it is accepted that, when there is no room for discretionary 
power or appreciation whatsoever, a reference to the applicable legal norm 
130  Case C-5/67 Beus GmbH v Hauptzollamt München [1968] 125. 
131  P. Craig, EU administrative…, p. 342 with reference to Case C-122/94 
Commission/Council, 1996 ECR I-881, recital 29 and Case 84/94 United Kingdom 
v Council, 1996 ECR I-5755, recitals 74 and 79. See also e.g. Case C-304/01 Spain 
v Commission, 2004 7655, recital 51; (the references in) H. C. H. Hofmann, G. C. Rowe, 
A. H. Türk, Administrative Law…, p. 199; K. Lenaerts, P. Van Nuel, Europees…, p. 587.
132  P. Craig, EU administrative…, p. 342 with references. For a  more detailed 
overview of the dierence in scope of the duty to give reasons for individual and 
normative (legislative) acts in the EU, see: Y. Benfquih, K. Deckers, D. Verhoeven, De 
motiveringsplicht…, p. 136, 144–146.
133  J. Schwarze, European…, p. 1415–1416. 
134  Case C-78/74 Deuka v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 
1975 ECR 421; J.-L. Autin, La motivation…, p. 85, 91.
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suffices for compliance with the duty to give reasons.135 Conversely, the 
duty to give reasons becomes stricter if the degree of discretionary power 
of the administration increases.136
48. As far as the Netherlands is concerned, the degree of room for 
appreciation or discretionary freedom possessed by the administration will 
also influence the range of the duty to give reasons. In case of a complex 
assessment of interests, the statement of reasons will have to be more 
elaborate than in the case of a technical application of law.137 Pursuant to 
Article 4:82 of the Awb, reference to a consistent line of conduct suffices to 
comply with the duty to give reasons, if and to the extent that this constant 
line of conduct has been anchored in a so-called ‘policy rule’ (‘beleidsregel’). 
In Dutch law, a  policy rule is a  general rule, contained in a  decision, 
which is not a by-law (a real normative decision, containing enforceable 
rules), regarding the assessment of interests, the establishment of facts or 
the interpretation of statutory rules in the exercise of an administrative 
body’s competence. Administrations typically use these instruments to 
streamline their discretionary powers and to increase the predictability, 
legal certainty and equality of their decisions. However, the administrative 
body has to assess the specificities of the case, in order to verify whether it 
is necessary to deviate from the policy rule.138 The lenient arrangement of 
Article 4:82 of the Awb does not apply in case of an alleged constant policy 
that has not been incorporated in a policy rule.139
49. In the EU, the ECJ has acknowledged that
where the Community institutions have […] a power of appraisal, respect for the 
rights guaranteed by the Community legal order in administrative procedures is 
of even more fundamental importance. Those guarantees include, in particular, 
the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all 
the relevant aspects of the individual case, the right of the person concerned 
to make his views known and to have an adequately reasoned decision. Only 
in this way can the Court verify whether the factual and legal elements upon 
which the exercise of the power of appraisal depends were present.140
With regard to the duty to give reasons, the Court has acknowledged 
that, if a decision comprises a specific assessment of a situation (meaning 
135  I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, Draagwijdte…, p. 129, 149 with reference to the 
preparatory documents of the Senate (Verslag Senaatscommissie, Gedr. St. Senaat, BZ 
1988, nr 215/3, 14 and 17) and to case law. 
136  Ibidem, p. 151. See e.g. RvS 12 February 1997, no. 64.486, Colleye. 
137  R. J. N. Schlössels, S. E. Zijlstra, Bestuursrecht…, p. 465 with multiple references. 
138  Ibidem, p. 463–464 with references to case law; G. A. C. M. van Ballegooij, 
T. Barkhuysen, W. den Ouden, J. E. M. Polak, Bestuursrecht…, p. 95.
139  Constant case law. See e.g. Rechtbank ‘s-Hertogenbosch 25 June 2010, 202162 / 
FA RK 09-6083. 
140  Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München-Mitte, 
1991 ECR I-5469, recital 14; K. Lenaerts, P. Van Nuel, Europees…, p. 587.
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that it involves an appreciation of facts and circumstances), it is partially 
outside the jurisdiction of the court. However, if – and by reason of the fact 
that – review of the Court is limited in those cases, whereas the margin of 
appreciation given to the administration is large, the duty to give reasons 
must be (all the more) strictly observed.141 Literature concludes from this 
case law that decisions have to ‘be more thoroughly reasoned the greater 
the discretionary power of the Commission’ and that there is a clear link 
‘between the range of the available discretion and the scope of the duty to 
give reasons.’142 
50. In France, there are not sufficient clues in the case law or legal 
doctrine that the degree of discretionary power has a substantial effect on 
the standard used by the Courts to assess compliance with the duty to give 
reasons. 
d. Situations in which a more enhanced / stricter duty  
to give reasons applies
51. In Belgium, it follows from the case law that the following circum-
stances give rise to an enhanced duty to give reasons: the administration 
deviates from a  (non-binding) advisory opinion, a  settled policy, previ-
ous decisions or the normal procedures; the arguments brought forward 
by the affected party or parties are refuted; an exception is granted; the 
most far-reaching or intrusive measure is chosen; the administration exer- 
cises a conditional power; the administration takes a decision that is not 
obvious.143
52. Pursuant to Article 3:50 of the Dutch Awb, an administrative 
organ that makes a decision and deviates from an advisory opinion that 
was given in view of that decision by virtue of a statutory provision, has 
to mention the deviation explicitly and has to provide a justification for 
it in its statement of reasons. Literature notes that, for opinions that are 
not obligatory pursuant to statutory law, the same obligation exists, but 
is based on the general principles of administrative law, rather than on 
the Awb.144 
Pennarts also mentions the following examples of (other) situations 
(derived from the case law) in which the duty to give reasons becomes 
stricter: the administration takes a  punitive penalty; it decides not to 
enforce the law although an illegal situation exists; expectations have been 
141  Case 36/59 Präsident Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellscha and Others v High Autho-
rity, 1960 ECR 857.
142  J. Schwarze, European…, p. 1410 with reference to the cited judgment and other 
case law. 
143  All discussed in: I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, Draagwijdte…, p. 129, 163–167. 
144  J. A. Damen, J. L. Boxum, K. J. de Graaf et al., Bestuursrecht (1) Deel I, Boom 
Juridische Uitgevers 2009, p. 433.
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raised, but the administration does not fulfil them; there is an unequal 
treatment of equal cases.145 
53. As far as the EU is concerned, an enhanced duty to give reasons 
exists if there is a deviation from a constant decision-making practice.146 
The same is true in cases where the recipient or addressee of a decision 
has not been able to communicate his/her concerns on the basis of the 
duty to be heard.147 Article 296 of the TFEU explicitly requires a referral to 
any proposals, initiatives, recommendations requests or opinions required 
by the Treaties. Contrary to what one may expect and to what is the case 
in the national systems discussed here, this does not imply an obligation 
to mention on the basis of which facts or data the Commission decided 
not to follow an (advisory) opinion.148 
Schematic overview149 
Situations in which the courts have already acknowledged that149  
an enhanced duty to give reasons applies
Belgium – Deviation from a non-binding advisory opinion. 
– Deviation from a constant policy / previous decisions.
– Deviation from the normal procedures. 
– Refutation of arguments brought forward by affected parties. 
– Granting of an exception. 
– Adoption of the most far-reaching or intrusive measure. 
– Exercise of a conditional power.
– Unobvious decision. 
145  H. F. T. Pennarts, Beginselen van…, p. 58.
146  J. H. Jans, R. de Lange, S. Prechal, R. J. G. M. Widdershoven, Inleiding tot…, 
p. 247 with reference to Case C-228/99 Silos, 2001 ECR I-8401, recital 28: ‘However, it 
is also accepted that, although the reasons for a decision in a line of consistent decisions 
may be given in a summary manner, for example by a reference to those decisions, the 
Community authority must give an explicit account of its reasoning if the decision goes 
appreciably further than the previous decisions […]’. See also Case 73/74 Papiers Peints 
v Commission, 1975 ECR 1491, recitals 31 and 33. 
147  Y. Benfquih, K. Deckers, D. Verhoeven, De motiveringsplicht…, p. 136, 147 with 
reference to e.g. Case T-181/08 Tay Za v Council [2010] ECR II-1965, recital 94: ‘If the 
party concerned is not aorded the opportunity to be heard before the adoption of an 
initial decision to freeze funds, compliance with the obligation to state reasons is all the 
more important because it constitutes the sole safeguard enabling the party concerned, 
especially a er the adoption of that decision, to make eective use of the legal remedies 
available to it to challenge the lawfulness of that decision […]’.
148  Case C-448/06 cp-Pharma 2008 ECR I-5685, recital 38; D. Keyaerts, Behoorlijke 
wetgeving…, p. 103, 117. See also the references in: Y. Benfquih, K. Deckers, D. Ver- 
hoeven, De motiveringsplicht…, p. 136, 142. e authors speak of a  ‘mere formal 
requirement’. 
149 is table mentions only those situations that have already been recognised as 
intensifying the duty to give reasons in the case law of the respective legal systems. It 
is quite possible that, in the future, these lists will evolve. Furthermore, the situations 
mentioned for all four systems reveal shared rationales: all situations in which either 
unobvious or particularly far-reaching decisions are made (from the citizen’s view-
point) seem to be targeted. 
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The Netherlands – Deviation from an advisory opinion.
– Punitive penalties.
– Decision not to enforce the law in the case of illegalities. 
– Unfulfilled expectations. 
– Unequal treatment. 
EU – Deviation from a settled decision-making practice.
– No right to be heard. 
E. What are the sanctions or legal remedies in case of non-compliance?
54. In the Netherlands, a failure to comply with the duty to give reasons 
can give rise to an annulment by the administrative courts.150 Pursuant 
to Article 6:22 of the Awb, however, this annulment does not have to 
be pronounced if it is plausible that the interested parties have not been 
harmed by the violation of, in casu, the duty to give reasons.151 Whereas 
it is generally assumed that this technique can only be applied in cases of 
merely formal deficiencies (the formal aspect of the duty to give reasons in 
the Netherlands: see supra, para 43), the case law of the Council of State 
has caused doubt as to whether it cannot also be applied to the substantive 
pillar of the duty to give reasons, i.e. the contents and carrying capacity of 
the statement of reasons.152 Another way in which the courts can avoid an 
annulment, is by offering the administrative body the possibility to correct 
the lack or insufficiency of a  statement of reasons, in the course of the 
procedure. This is known as the ‘administrative loop’ (bestuurlijke lus).153 
55. In Belgium, the situation looks quite similar. The duty to give 
reasons is considered a  so-called ‘substantial formal requirement’ (sub- 
stantieel vormvoorschrift / forme substantielle), signifying that it constitutes 
a  ground of review used by the Council of State.154 The Council offers 
legal redress in the form of an annulment. The same applies to most other 
(special) administrative courts. The civil courts who apply Article 159 of the 
Belgian Constitution, can declare an administrative decision inapplicable 
in a pending case155 because it does not comply with the duty to give reasons. 
The Belgian Council of State, however, mitigates the automatic annulment 
of a  decision that does not comply with the duty to provide reasons 
(because reasons are lacking or because the statement is insufficient). In 
150  Article 8:72(1) of the Awb.
151  is provision also applies to administrative appeals. 
152  See ABRvS 26 February 2000, no. 199901856 and the case note by J. Verheij 
in 2002, AB 42. e Council suggests that Article 6:22 can also be applied in cases 
where the statement of reasons does not have sucient ‘carrying capacity’, as long as 
the applicant is not disadvantaged by this application. It could be argued, however, that 
the deciency at stake, i.e. the lack of notication of an advisory document, was formal 
rather than substantive. Cf. R. J. N. Schlössels, S. E. Zijlstra, Bestuursrecht in…, p. 463 
and H. F. T. Pennarts, Beginselen van…, p. 57.
153  Article 8:51a–8:51d of the Awb. 
154  Article 1, §1 of the RvS-Wet. 
155  is is not an annulment and it does not have value erga omnes. 
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a number of judgments, the Council has ruled that it would not pronounce 
an annulment in those cases where the applicant’s interests have not been 
harmed, because (s)he clearly knows the reasons underlying the decision. 
This implies that the applicant has learnt about these reasons in some 
other way and that the circumstances were such as to assure that his/her 
right to defend him-/herself against the decision was not hampered.156 The 
Council of State consequently adopts a  teleological approach, assessing 
whether the goals behind the duty to provide reasons have been fulfilled. 
Similarly, the Council refuses to annul a decision in those cases where all 
discretionary power is lacking and where the administration will (have 
to) take a decision with exactly the same contents, should the challenged 
administrative act be annulled.157 In 2014, Belgium had also introduced 
the ‘administrative loop’ in the procedure before the Council of State.158 
Its scope, however, was more limited than that of its Dutch counterpart, 
primarily because the law stipulated that the correction of this deficiency 
could not affect the contents of the decision. This implied that only formal 
deficiencies qualified for the application of this technique. As far as 
the duty to give reasons is concerned, one could think of a statement of 
reasons that refers to and relies on an advisory document that has not been 
notified to the applicant (although this is a requirement: supra, para 39).159 
In 2015, however, the provisions on the ‘administrative loop’ were found 
inconstitutional by the Belgian Constitutional Court and were annulled.160
56. In France, the administrative courts will annul a decision that does 
not comply with the duty to give reasons as conceived of by the CRPA, 
because it is either lacking or its content is insufficient. Mere formal 
deficiencies amount to a so-called ‘vice de forme’161, an aspect of the act’s 
‘ légalité externe’, whereas more substantive scrutiny of the reasons provided 
constitutes a question of ‘ légalité interne’.162 Note that Article L211-6 of the 
CRPA contains a special arrangement in case of absolute urgency (supra). 
If the administration has no discretionary power whatsoever (in case of 
a  so-called ‘compétence liée’), the Council of State will nevertheless not 
annul the act.163
156  See e.g. RvS 15 October 2012, no. 220.998, Neirynck; I. Opdebeek, A. Cool- 
saet, Draagwijdte van de formele motiveringsplicht, in: Formele motivering van 
bestuurshandelingen (eds.) I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, die Keure 2013, p. 129, 132–133 
and 189–195 with various references. 
157  E.g. RvS 24 September 1997, no. 68.266, Iserentant. 
158  Art. 38 of the RvS-Wet. 
159  See the suggestions in: P. Lefranc, Ceci n’est pas une boucle administrative, in: De 
hervorming van de Raad van State (eds.) M. Van Damme, Die Keure 2014, p. 51, 69.
160  GwH 16 July 2015, no. 103/2015.
161  N. Songolo, La motivation des actes administratifs, http://www.village-justice.
com/articles/motivation-actes-administratifs,10849.html (12.03.2015).
162  J.-L. Autin, La motivation…, p. 85, 92; M. Gros, Droit administratif…, p. 151.
163  E.g. Conseil d’État 3 novembre 1995, no. 122794, le Préfet des Yvelines: ‘[Q]u’il 
résulte de ces dispositions que le maire de Buc était tenu de prendre les deux arrêtés 
130
The Duty to Give Reasons in the European Legal Area… RAP 2016 (2)
57. In the EU, the duty to provide reasons has been labelled ‘one of 
the essential procedural requirements within the meaning of the first 
paragraph of Article 173 of the EEC [now Article 263 of the TFEU], breach 
of which gives rise to a claim,’164 which can lead to annulment. Deficiencies 
in the statement of reasons may, however, be ‘neutralised’ by the fact that 
the applicant clearly knows and understands these reasons. In those cases, 
the decision is deemed lawful and not in violation with the duty to give 
reasons.165 The Court is, however, reluctant to accept submissions by 
defending and intervening parties who argue as if compliance with the 
duty to give reasons would be a mere question of (excessive) formalism.166 
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 264 of the TFEU, the ECJ can 
decide to state which of the effects of the act which it has declared void 
shall be considered definitive. This has been applied in cases where the 
illegality of an act was located in the duty to give reasons.167 Finally, EU 
law considers the duty to give reasons as a ‘public policy plea’ or a ‘moyen 
d’ordre public’, signifying, amongst other things, that the Courts can bring 
it up in the course of the procedure, even if the applicant has not mentioned 
it in their submissions.168
58. When it comes to the duty to give reasons and legal protection 
against non-compliance, many other questions arise. Like many violations 
of the law, a violation of the duty to give reasons may also, depending of 
du 18 juin 1985 tendant à la dépose des deux panneaux implantés par la société ODIP 
respectivement aux nos 836 et 1500 de la rue Louis Blériot ; que le moyen tiré du défaut 
de motivation de ces arrêtés municipaux au regard des exigences posées par la loi du11 
juillet 1979 est par suite inopérant.’ See: J.-Y. Vincent, G. Quillévéré, Fascicule 107–30: 
Motivation…, para 118.
164  J. Schwarze, European…, p. 1401. 
165  Case 275/80 Krupp v. Commission, 1981 ECR 2512, recital 13; e knowledge 
that a  person has more generally plays a  role as well. See: J. Schwarze, European…, 
p. 1411. 
166  See Case C-370/07 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the 
European Union, 2009 ECR I-8917. 
167  Ibidem, recitals 63 . 
168  See e.g. Case T-318/00, Freistaat üringen v Commission, 2005 ECR II-4179, 
recital 109: ‘e Court of First Instance also notes that it does not have all the 
information necessary to enable it to carry out its review on the merits of the contested 
decision and that it is therefore necessary for it to raise of its own motion the plea 
alleging failure to state reasons on this point in the contested decision […]’; Hanns 
Peter Nehl, ‘Good administration as procedural right and/or general principle?’ in: 
H. C. H. Hofmann, A. H. Türk, Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law. Towards 
an Integrated Administration, Edward Elgar, Chelhamten 2009, p. 322, 326. See also: 
Y. Benfquih, K. Deckers, D. Verhoeven, De motiveringsplicht…, p. 136, 154–155; 
K. Lenaerts, P. Van Nuel, Europees recht, Intersentia 2011, p. 586. In Belgium, most 
case law agrees that the duty to give reasons does not constitute a ‘moyen d’ordre public’: 
I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, Aard van de formele motiveringsplicht, in: Formele motivering 
van bestuurshandelingen, (eds.) I. Opdebeek, A. Coolsaet, die Keure 2013, p. 109, 120. 
e same is true for France: M. Gros, Droit administratif…, p. 151.
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course on the applicable rules in each legal system169, give rise to claims for 
compensation of damages. It will, however, not be easy to establish a clear 
causal link between non-compliance with the duty to give reasons and the 
damage suffered. These and other questions go beyond the objective and 
scope of this article. 
Summary
In the three national systems studied, as well as in the EU, a violation 
of the duty to give reasons will lead to an annulment, unless the applicant 
(or his interests) has (have) not been harmed. The Netherlands, moreover, 
offers a possibility of improving a statement of reasons that is insufficient 
via the technique of the ‘administrative loop’. 
III. The duty to give reasons as an instrument that fosters accountability through 
transparency 
A. The relationship between transparency, the duty to give reasons 
and accountability 
59. The core idea behind the duty to give reasons is that it offers 
transparency on the level of the motives or justifications that have inspired 
a decision. Even though the word seems to have become one of the mantras 
of administrative law170, transparency is not an independent or stand-alone 
value. As a principle of good governance, transparency should rather be 
regarded as a means to an end.171 Indeed, the duty to give reasons has no 
value if it is considered an instrument that aims to foster transparency 
for its own sake: it serves a more substantive goal. Our hypothesis is that, 
in the context of the duty to give reasons, that ‘end’ could befostering the 
accountability of modern administrations. 
60. The relationship between transparency and accountability or legi- 
timacy requires clarification. Is transparency indeed a ‘means’ to accoun- 
tability? Considering, as we have just argued, that transparency is 
a  means to an end, it should be emphasised that transparency in its 
most basic form, i.e. openness, does not in itself constitute a  form of 
accountability. Bovens, famous for his conceptual work on accountability, 
169  In France, the legal doctrine defends and derives from the case law that a violation 
of the duty to give reasons, as a so-called ‘illégalité externe’, does not constitute a ‘faute’ 
and cannot give rise to a  claim for damages. See: M. Gros, Droit administratif…, 
p. 151. More nuanced: J.-Y. Vincent, G. Quillévéré, Fascicule 107–30: Motivation…, 
p. 123. 
170  See e.g. E. Scholtes, Transparantie, icoon van een dolende overheid / Transparancy, 
symbol of a driing government, Lemma 2012.
171  Not all literature supports this premise, though. For dierent positions on 
transparency as having intrinsic rather than instrumental value and vice versa, see: 
A. Buijze, e Principle of Transparency in EU law, BOXPress 2013, p. 36–51.
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makes a  distinction between ‘accountability as a  virtue’ as opposed to 
‘accountability as a  mechanism’. The first phrase covers values such as 
transparency, participation and dialogue, whereas the latter covers those 
provisions and procedures that correspond to Bovens’ actual definition 
of accountability (sensu stricto) as ‘a  relationship between an actor and 
a  forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify 
his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and 
the actor may face consequences’.172 Forms of ‘accountability as a virtue’,173 
which do not presuppose a  relationship between an actor and a  forum, 
relate to a ‘willingness to act in a transparent, fair and equitable way’174 and 
actually represent principles of good (public or corporate) governance.175 If 
anything, accountability as a virtue is a ‘normative concept’, which presents 
a ‘set of standards for the evaluation of the behaviour of public actors’.176 
Accountability as a (social) mechanism, on the other hand, relates to an 
‘institutional relation or arrangement in which an agent can be held to 
account by another agent or institution… And the focus of accountability 
studies is not whether the agents have acted in an accountable way, but 
whether they are or can be held accountable ex post facto by accountability 
forums’.177 
61. According to Bovens, transparency is not enough to constitute 
accountability in the strict, relational sense:
Open government and freedom of information are very important pre- 
requisites for accountability in the context of European governance, because 
they may provide accountability forums with the necessary information. 
However, transparency as such is not enough to qualify as a genuine form of 
accountability, because transparency does not necessarily involve scrutiny by 
a specific forum.178
62. Pursuant to Papadopoulos, transparency is a necessary condition 
for accountability, but does not constitute a form of accountability in itself 
because it does not allow for sanctions to be imposed.179 A similar reasoning 
172  M. Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework, 
“European Law Journal” 2007, no. 13, issue 4, p. 447, 450. 
173  M. Bovens, Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as 
a Mechanism, “West European Politics” 2010, no. 33, issue 5, p. 946, 946–967.
174  Ibidem, p. 949. 
175  Ibidem, p. 961.
176  Ibidem, p. 946, 947 and 949.
177  Ibidem, p. 948.
178  M. Bovens, Analysing and Assessing…, p. 447, 453. In the same sense: D. Curtin, 
Holding (Quasi)Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public Account, “European 
Law Journal” 2007, no. 13, issue 4, p. 523, 532. 
179  Y. Papadopoulos, Problems of Democratic Accountability in Network and 
Multilevel Governance, “European Law Journal” 2007, no. 13, issue 4, p. 469, 474. In the 
same sense: A. Meijer, S. Grimmelikhuijsen, G. J. Brandsma, Transparantie. Verbreedt 
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is found in the work of Mulgan, who points out that only if those who 
receive information also have the right to demand it and to seek remedies 
there can be talk of accountability. ‘Purely voluntary or grace-and-favour 
transparency does not amount to accountability.’180 Whilst procedural 
guarantees and especially duties of consultation and transparency indeed 
involve citizens in the decision-making process in a much more direct way 
than the procedures of representative democracy do, they often lack the 
element of genuine debate and interaction and always lack the element of 
an instant possibility to sanction those responsible for decision-making. 
63. There is little doubt that the duty to give reasons creates a type of 
transparency that is ‘relational’ in nature. It involves an actor, explaining 
him- or herself to a forum, which is protected by a legal guarantee on the 
basis of which it can force the actor to justify him- or herself. Moreover, the 
violation of this procedural guarantee is subject to sanctions, considering 
the possibility of referring the matter to the courts, where relief can be 
offered to the claimant seeking justice. Therefore, we can conclude that 
the process of giving a proper justification for an administrative decision 
involves more than just transparency for the sake of transparency. It is an 
argumentative process that provides targeted information. An important 
condition for transparency to lead to effective accountability is indeed 
that it leads to the disclosure of relevant information only. One can easily 
think of situations in which too much openness, too much information 
could lead to disinformation and could thus defeat the purpose of account-
giving. Too much transparency can, paradoxically, lead to opacity. The fact 
that all the systems studied require the statement of reasons to be clear and 
tailored to the specific decision and the facts at hand shows that, sometimes, 
a concise statement of reasons may be better from the viewpoint of quality 
than a long and elaborate one. The qualitative thresholds that the courts 
apply and uphold are particularly important in this regard.
en versterkt openbaarmaking de publieke verantwoording?, in: Handboek publieke 
verantwoording, (eds.) M. Bovens, T. Schillemans, Lemma 2009, p. 205, 211.
180  R. Mulgan, Holding power to account: accountability in modern democracies, 
Palgrave Macmillan 2003, p. 10, 11. See p. 10: ‘If scrutiny and transparency never 
resulted in remedial action, including, where necessary, the punishment of those found 
responsible for improper action, the process of accountability would be seriously 
incomplete. e full core sense of accountability thus includes the right of the account-
holder to investigate and scrutinize the actions of the agent by seeking information and 
explanations and the right to impose remedies and sanctions.’ And p. 101: ‘Freedom of 
information, on the other hand, though more extensive in the areas covered is more 
restricted in accountability processes, being conned to the prior stage of information 
and justifying, without oering opportunities for critical discussion or rectication 
(except in the case of correcting personal misinformation).’
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B. The duty to give reasons as a mechanism for accountability: 
a question of human dignity?  
64. In times where the administrative realm has become so vast 
and varied that the electoral process can no longer guarantee full and 
complete oversight, the executive increasingly derives its legitimacy from 
alternative sources. One of these sources are procedural guarantees, such 
as the duty to give reasons. In the United States, procedural guarantees, 
such as duties to consult and give reasons, are conceived of as mechanisms 
that, apart from providing legal protection to those directly affected, 
have to offer guarantees against non-elected power and thus contribute 
to the democratic legitimacy of administrative decision-making. The 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) has played a  central role in this 
regard.181 It should be noted that the APA also targets rule-making powers, 
whereas most procedural safeguards in Europe have been primarily 
designed to be applied to decisions with an individual scope.182 This 
also explains why along the way the APA’s rules and procedures started 
to be conceived as safeguards for both the quality and legitimacy of the 
decision-making process. In most European traditions, the need to employ 
procedural rules and guarantees in order to strengthen the legitimacy of 
administrative decision-making has only emerged in recent decades, as 
legislatures started to entrust the executive with ever broader discretionary 
powers, amongst which rule-making powers.
65. Since then, accountability has become a  central concern of 
European public lawyers in an era of multilevel governance, involving 
a  plethora of state and non-state actors that today constitute the 
‘government’. This is especially true in the context of EU supranational 
decision-making. Lindseth has characterised the EU political and legal 
order as ‘administrative, not constitutional’. In his famous work on power 
181  S. Rose-Ackerman, e Regulatory State, in: e Oxford Handbook of Compar-
ative Constitutional Law, (eds.) M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó, Oxford University Press 2012, 
p. 671, 672 on the APA: ‘is legal framework can be understood as a way to assure 
the democratic acceptability of policymaking delegation.’ See also p. 674: ‘e APA’s 
equirements for notice, hearings, and reason-giving help to assure third-party par-
ticipation and to limit closed-door decision-making. Even though the constraints are 
nominally procedural, they have substantive eects.’ See also: C. Donnelly, Participa-
tion and expertise: judicial attitudes in comparative perspective, in: Comparative Admin-
istrative Law, (eds.) S. Rose-Ackerman, P. Lindseth, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2010, 
p. 357, 358. e author points out that ‘originally conceived as an aid to agencies in 
gathering information’, the APA’s ‘notice and comment’ procedure ‘became signicant-
ly more participatory over the late 1960s and 1970s onwards’.
182  In most states, the goals behind legislative or other rule-making acts are 
contained in separate documents, such as explanatory memoranda, nowadays mostly 
published on the websites of legislative assemblies, but not part of the actual text of the 
legislative document. In the EU, on the other hand, the preamble of a normative text 
constitutes an impartible piece of the text itself. 
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and legitimacy in the EU context183, he argues that the Union’s genesis 
lies in acts delegated from the Member States to the EU. Since the EU is, 
essentially, a regulatory order, this process is very much comparable to the 
transfer of powers to a  regulatory agency. The relationship between the 
Member States and the Union can therefore be compared to that between 
a principal and an agent. Approaching the EU as an administrative legal 
order and rejecting its distinct, independent constitutional nature, as 
Lindseth does, explains a  lot about the legal principles that govern the 
relationship between the EU on the one hand and its Member States as 
well as their legal subjects on the other hand. These will be predominantly 
administrative in nature. This explains why the duty to give reasons, 
as a  general safeguard, in the EU context applies to normative as well 
as individual acts. In this model, the position of the EU legislature, as 
a normative body, should not be compared to that of a legislative body in 
a full-fledged constitutional order like the national one. As an agent with 
conferred powers, the EU has to provide reasons for all its decisions in 
order to build and maintain its legitimacy. It owes this duty to the Member 
States and their citizens. 
66. From this perspective, it may seem that the duty to give 
reasons, along with other procedural guarantees, first and foremost 
fulfils a  compensatory role. It fills a  legitimacy gap created by modern 
institutional arrangements that often go hand in hand with a  reduced 
influence of the mechanisms of representative democracy. It does so by 
creating a  direct link between the administration and the administered 
and by reinforcing judicial protection. This would imply, however, that in 
a perfectly centralised model, without a supranational context or without 
phenomena such as agencification, the duty to give reasons would lose 
its raison d’être. Or does the duty to give reasons find its justification in 
a more fundamental rationale? 
67. The American scholar Mashaw has argued that ‘the reasons most 
commonly advanced for reason giving in both the EU and the US systems 
tend to ignore reason giving’s most fundamental function – the creation of 
authentic democratic governance.’184 In order to substantiate his argument, 
he refutes the mere recourse to ‘reasons of the consequentialist sort’ for 
reason-giving.185 What he means is that US and EU administrative law 
‘tend to treat the right to reasons as a contingent right, one that is parasitic 
on other substantive or procedural rights or institutional arrangements’.186 
In the US, the right to reasons ‘is conventionally understood as parasitic 
183  P. L. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation State, 
Oxford University Press 2010. 
184  J. L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration…, p. 101.
185  Ibidem, p. 103.
186  Ibidem, p. 105.
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on other rights or on the necessities of effective judicial review.’187 Conse- 
quently, it is no stand-alone right, but a ‘contingent’ one.188 More precisely, 
in individual, adjudicatory cases, the courts use reason-giving to ensure 
that the right to a  hearing is respected and ‘is not a  charade’, which 
contributes to decision-making on the basis of reliable evidence. According 
to the author, this makes the right to reasons ‘wholly instrumental’.189
In short, due process requirements of procedural protection, including the 
requirement of reason giving, are part of a  social welfare calculation that 
weighs and balances the importance of the individual’s substantive claim, and 
the likely contribution of any particular procedural requirement to the accurate 
determination of that claim against the government’s interest in effectiveness 
and efficiency.190
68. As far as rule-making powers are concerned, the situation is similar. 
The APA grants the affected parties a right to comment on draft rules or 
regulations. Since the 1960s and 1970s, ‘[c]ourts routinely return decisions 
to administrative agencies on the ground that the rationale provided is 
inadequate to explain some critical fact or issue that the agency was required 
to consider.’191 Here, reason-giving facilitates judicial review where the 
administration enjoys broad discretionary powers.192 Whilst many regard 
the APA as an instrument that, apart from legal protection, also fosters 
legitimacy via democratic participation193, Mashaw is skeptical. 
69. More important for our analysis, however, is that the author 
discerns a similar role for the duty to give reasons in EU law, making him 
conclude that
in both American and European Union jurisprudence, the right to receive 
reasons is a  sort of derivative right. It facilitates individual decision making 
about whether to contest official decisions, protects rights to individualised 
adjudication, and promotes the monitoring activities of both political and legal 
institutions. And reasons in both systems have a special value in maintaining 
vigorous judicial review along the treacherous boundary between law and 
187  Ibidem, p. 105.
188  Ibidem, p. 111.
189  Ibidem, p. 106–107. Emphasis added.
190  Ibidem, p. 107. 
191  Ibidem, p. 110.
192  Ibidem, p. 111: ‘e proceduralisation of rationality – the conversion of the 
demand for nonarbitrariness into a  demand for understandable reason giving – 
rephrases the question of whether the agency’s action is reasonable in some substantive 
sense as a demand that the agency demonstrate a reasoning process. e demand for 
reasons and yet more reasons, at least rhetorically, keeps the court within its appropriate 
domain. e agency may make policy choices, so long as it explains how its exercise 
of discretion is connected to its statutory authority and to the technical facts that have 
been developed through the rulemaking proceeding.’
193  Supra, p. 65.
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policy. From this perspective, the fundamental value of reason giving is 
political and legal accountability. The requirement that administrative officials 
give reasons is merely a crucially important means to that end.194
70. This analysis is in line with what our comparative analysis has 
revealed195: in all the systems studied, the duty to give reasons first and 
foremost aims to contribute to a  fair and effective system of judicial 
protection. As such, this is a  very valuable goal to pursue. Moreover, 
as such, it already indicates that the duty to give reasons reinforces the 
accountability of the administration. This is because judicial protection 
amounts to legal accountability, which has an individual as well as a public 
dimension, because courts and their decisions are in principle open and 
accessible to all. In that regard, the duty to give reasons is a  necessary 
precondition for the courts to be an effective, rather than an illusory or 
symbolic venue for account-giving and responsiveness.
71. However, this perspective on the way in which and the extent 
to which the duty to give reasons can play a  role as an accountability 
mechanism, may be too narrow. Mashaw argues that the real reason 
for reason-giving is (or should be) located in the moral autonomy of the 
individual, in the sense that 
to be subject to administrative authority that is unreasoned is to be treated 
as a mere object of the law or political power, not a subject with independent 
rational capacities. Unreasoned coercion denies our moral agency and our 
political standing as citizens entitled to respect as ends in ourselves, not as mere 
means in the effectuation of powers.196
Because of the large coercive and discretionary power of administrators, 
decisions require a  justification and legitimisation beyond the (in the 
case of administrative decisions often remote or indirect) mechanism of 
elected representation. Adopting the Arisotelean view of responsibility 
and the Kantian perspective on human dignity, Mashaw argues that ‘the 
fundamental reason for accepting law, or any official decision making, as 
legitimate, is that reasons can be given why those subject to the law would 
affirm its content as serving recognizable collective purposes’.197 The author 
argues that the right to reasons should be treated as a ‘fundamental, rather 
than a  contingent or derivative human right. Authority without reason 
is literally dehumanising. It is, therefore, fundamentally at war with the 
promise of democracy, which is, after all, self-government.’198
194  Ibidem, p. 115.
195  Title II, B. 
196  Ibidem, p. 104–105. 
197  Ibidem, p. 117–118. 
198  Ibidem, p. 118. 
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72. A  theory about the rationales behind reason-giving that is close 
to that of Mashaw, is found in the work of Nehl. According to Nehl, 
formalised procedures ‘are essentially determined by two fundamental 
rationales, namely rationality and efficiency on the one hand and 
individual protection on the other.’199 Rationality and efficiency are 
labelled‘utilitarian justifications’.200 The author suggests that this
needs to be completed by – and opposed to – a  somewhat overlapping 
dignitary or protective justification of process rules in general and procedural 
rights in particular. This concept essentially takes into account the impact of 
administrative decisions on the individual who is subject to the exercise of 
public power. The recognition of personal dignity, autonomy and freedom 
as inalienable fundamental values has as its corollary the need effectively to 
protect them against arbitrary and unlawful encroachments on the part of the 
public bodies.201
The more the protective justification is emphasizsed, the more it grants 
procedural law a value of its own and, accordingly, increases its legitimizing 
function from the standpoint of the citizen,’ the author argues.202 He is sceptical 
about the extent to which the case law of the EU courts considers the duty to 
give reasons as an instrument that fosters participation. The instrument is still 
primarily conceived of as one that serves legal protection as a value of the rule 
of law than as one with a legitimising, democratic role. He contrasts this view 
with that of the US courts with respect to agency rule-making.203 
73. Mashaw argues that the fundamental right to know the reasons 
behind an administrative decision has ‘important implications for the 
ongoing project of democratic governance in unavoidably administrative 
states.204 More precisely, ‘[r]easoned administration is not only fundamental 
to our understanding of ourselves as independent moral agents, but to the 
future of the democratic project itself.’205 ‘Reason giving thus affirms the 
centrality of the individual in the democratic republic. It treats persons 
as rational moral agents who are entitled to evaluate and participate in 
a  dialogue about official policies on the basis of reasoned discussion. It 
affirms the individual as subject rather than object of law.’206
199  H. P. Nehl, Good administration as procedural right and/or general principle?, in: 
H. C. H. Hofmann, A. H. Türk, Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law…, p. 322, 
343.
200  Ibidem, p. 343–344. 
201  Ibidem, p. 345. 
202  Ibidem, p. 346–347. Emphasis added.
203  Ibidem, p. 349.
204  J. L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: the European Union, the United States, 
and the Project of Democratic Governance, “Faculty Scholarship Series” 2007, Paper 
1179, p. 105. Emphasis added.
205  Ibidem, p. 123. 
206  Ibidem, p. 118. 
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Mashaw’s analysis thus links the reason behind reason-giving directly 
and without any need for further reasons, to the most central feature of 
administrative power: its coercive nature. 
C. The duty to give reasons as a mechanism for public accountability? 
74. The conclusion of our analysis thus far is that the duty to give 
reasons definitely plays a role as an accountability mechanism, but that its 
role is strongly linked to the relationship between the administration and 
individuals affected by a given decision. ‘Public’ accountability, however, 
goes beyond the relationship between the administration and direct 
stakeholders. It involves the public as a whole. The duty to give reasons, as 
it is currently conceived of and delineated in the EU and in the domestic 
systems studied here, targets individuals directly affected by the decisions 
taken and not, or at least not primarily, the public as a  whole. Multiple 
characteristics that are shared by all or the majority of the systems studied 
in this article demonstrate this. One example is that, in order for a referral 
to an external document to be permissible, the courts assess whether that 
document is known / has been notified to the applicant as an affected party. 
Another example is the fact that a lack of or a deficiency in the statement 
of reasons does not amount to an illegality or (a slightly different situation) 
does not lead to an annulment if the applicant has acquired knowledge of 
the reasons in another way. In both instances, the interests of the applicant 
are central. Finally, the three national systems studied in this article do not 
apply the duty to give reasons to by-laws, but limit it to adjudicatory acts, 
which by definition address only one or a limited number of citizens. 
75. We have seen that the extent to which information is revealed 
via the duty to give reasons is directly proportionate to the other, more 
stand-alone goals that it serves. The legal systems that were analysed in 
this article have indeed adopted a teleological approach towards the scope 
of the duty to give reasons: the information provided has to allow for the 
rationales behind the duty to be fulfilled. These rationales mostly relate 
to the reinforcement of the position of the individual who is affected by 
the decision in question. Accepting that the duty to give reasons should 
contribute to public accountability would imply major changes in terms 
of scope and range. It could, for instance, require that the administration 
actively and explicitly weighs its decision against all possible aspects of 
the public interest at stake and clarifies, in writing, which policy trade-
offs it has made to reach a certain decision. As for decisions that involve 
broad discretionary powers, i.e. those for which the duty to give reasons 
is considered especially important, this degree of transparency would be 
a particularly heavy burden for the administration to carry. Moreover, if 
public accountability becomes a central goal of the duty to give reasons, 
normative decisions, that, per definition apply to the entire population or 
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a large group of people, should be brought under its scope, as is the case in 
the EU. Such an extension is worth considering for national systems where 
this is not the case, such as those studied in our comparative analysis. 
EU law demonstrates, however, that the standards and requirements for 
the duty to give reasons are substantially less far-reaching than those 
for individual decisions. 
76. In sum, the duty to give reasons does not constitute a full-fledged 
mechanism of ‘public’ accountability, but it does provide effective 
accountability in the relationship between those directly affected by 
a decision and the administration. Since this type of accountability serves 
the moral autonomy of the individual and – thus – human dignity, it is, 
however, no less fundamental than ‘public’ accountability sensu stricto. 
IV. Final conclusions and a look to the future…
77. This article had a double purpose. Firstly, it intended to demonstrate 
that the way in which the duty to give reasons is conceived of in various 
European legal systems still varies. This raises the question of whether there 
is such a thing as the duty to give reasons as a shared concept of European 
administrative law. Moreover, the differences vary in nature: they concern 
the status (constitutional or not), scope and range of the various ‘duties’ to 
give reasons. As most of the conclusions of the descriptive analysis were 
summarised in a schematic form throughout this analysis, they will not be 
reiterated here. 
78. Secondly, our aim was to investigate whether and to what extent 
the duty to give reasons is part of a  general trend in which procedural 
guarantees become central to securing the administration’s accountability 
in the modern state. The central question was whether the type of 
transparency provided by the duty to give reasons is conducive to more 
accountable and therefore more legitimate administrative decision-
making. And, if so, how does it achieve that aim? It is obvious that the 
duty to give reasons contributes to legal accountability via the courts. 
Relying on the work of other scholars, however, we argued that there could 
a  deeper, more fundamental link between the duty to give reasons and 
accountability to citizens affected by administrative decisions. The duty to 
give reasons serves citizens’ moral autonomy by making the administration 
directly accountable to them for single coercive decisions. This implies that 
the duty to give reasons is not so much fit to be an instrument for public 
accountability, but has the potential of creating a genuine relationship of 
accountability in the relation between the administration and the directly 
affected parties.
79. This approach of the duty to give reasons as a mechanism that is 
strongly linked to individual human dignity seems to encourage a shift in 
terminology or discourse from a ‘duty’ to ‘give’ reasons to a ‘(fundamental) 
right to receive reasons’. By anchoring the duty to give reasons in Article 41 
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of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the EU has made a first step in 
that direction. Unlike the other fundamental rights of the Charter, however, 
Article 41 does not directly affect the Member States. The question arises 
whether there is a link between the reason not to make Article 41 applicable 
to the Member States and the fact that there are still important differences 
between the way in which various European legal systems conceive of ‘good 
administration’ and the various duties or principles subsumed under that 
umbrella. It is not unlikely that the Member States have made a conscious 
choice to reserve as much freedom as possible to uphold their own, home-
grown standards of procedural justice, even when they implement or 
apply EU law. This could explain the limited scope of Article 41. It has 
been argued that the rights and principles mentioned in Article 41 of the 
Charter ‘mirror some basic rationales of procedure or ‘procedural justice’ 
common to all European administrative systems’,207 ‘Basic’ seems a crucial 
adjective in this statement: many of these principles of procedural justice 
still differ when it comes to their precise scope and range. 
80. To what extent do the four legal systems that we have analysed 
reveal features of the notion of the duty to give reasons as an individual 
fundamental right? It seems that some of them are much closer to such an 
approach than others. 
One important indicator to us seems to be the extent to which each 
system allows for exceptions to the duty. An essential feature of a (qualified) 
fundamental right is that it can be limited, but only for (specific) reasons or 
objectives of general interest. This is also acknowledged by Article 52(2) of 
the Charter. As our comparative analysis reveals, some Member States are 
quite liberal in allowing for exceptions to the duty to give reasons, whereas 
others are not. ‘Urgency’, for instance, is accepted as a reason for exception 
in the Netherlands and France (with a possibility of later rectification), but 
not in Belgium. The EU itself seems to adopt the most restrictive approach, 
since it does not accept real exceptions to the duty to give reasons, but only 
situations in which the duty is tempered. This comparative result seems 
to be in line with the recent ‘upgrade’ that the duty to give reasons has 
received in both the EU and Belgium. As we have explained, the duty to 
give reasons has (quasi-) constitutional status in the EU (via the TFEU and 
Article 41 of the Charter). In Belgium, the Constitutional Court has only 
very recently suggested that the WMB has constitutional value.208 
Another indicator is the scope ratione materiae of the duty to give 
reasons. We have seen that France applies the duty to give reasons only 
to certain categories of administrative decisions. A  fundamental right to 
receive reasons, which finds its basis in the moral autonomy of individuals, 
should arguably encompass all unilateral administrative decisions. Recently, 
207  H. P. Nehl, Good administration…, p. 322, 323.
208 Supra, para 10.
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a French author has argued that the lack of recognition of a general duty 
to give reasons, applicable to all administrative decisions (supra), is hard 
to reconcile with the fundamental right anchored in Article 15 of the 
Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, which states that ‘la société 
a le droit de demander compte à tout agent public de son administration’.209 
81. The question arises whether and to what extent the EU can play 
a further harmonising role in this regard. As explained above, the EU applies 
the principles of good administration, as general principles of law, to the 
Member States when they implement EU law. The EU legal order has been 
characterised as one of ‘adversarial legalism’, signifying that it ‘combines 
centrally formulated prescriptive rules and a  diffuse and fragmented 
process of enforcement which depends crucially on judicial review to 
ensure compliance’.210 This decentralised mode of implementation and 
enforcement has forced the ECJ ‘to impose some measure of uniformity on 
national administrative processes in order to ensure effective enforcement 
of EU rules and standards’.211 Hence, EU law may influence domestic law, 
also outside those areas where the Member States have to comply with the 
European standard.212 The future will reveal whether the EU will indeed 
have a unifying impact213 and whether this will eventually lead to the full 
recognition and implementation of a genuine fundamental ‘right to receive 
reasons’ throughout the European legal area.
82. In any case, the search for common European principles of admini- 
strative law remains high on the agenda of legal academia. Recently, a group 
of academics called ReNEAL (Research Network on EU Administrative 
209  O. Gabarda, Vers la généralisation…, p. 61, 63.
210  S. Rose-Ackerman, P. L. Lindseth, Comparative Administrative Law: Outlining 
a Field of Study, “Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice”, 2010, p. 435, 447.
211  Ibidem, p. 447. 
212  In order to avoid a ‘two-speed justice’: J. Bell, Mechanisms for Cross-fertilization 
of Administrative Law in Europe, in: New Directions in European Public Law, (eds.) 
J. Beatson, T. Tridimas, Hart 1998, p. 147, 160.
213  e French doctrine expects that the limited scope of the duty to give 
reasons in France will be put under increasing pressure due to the inuence of 
EU, especially considering the entry into force of Article 41 of the Charter. See 
O. Gabarda, Vers la généralisation…, p. 61, 67–70; J.-L. Autin, La motivation…, 
p. 85, 99; K. Michelet, La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne et la 
procédure administrative non contentieuse, “Actualite Juridique Droit Administratif ” 
2002, p. 949, 954 and 955. Others have argued more broadly, outside the strict context 
of the duty to give reasons, that French administrative law has undergone a ‘procedural 
transformation under the inuence of European integration’ (D. Custos, Independent 
administrative authorities in France: structural and procedural change at the intersection 
of Americanization, Europeanization and Gallicization, in: S. Rose-Ackerman, 
P. L. Lindseth, Comparative Administrative Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2010, 
p. 277, 283). See also: J. H. Jans, R. de Lange, S. Prechal, R. J. G. M. Widdershoven, 
Inleiding tot het Europees Bestuursrecht, Ars Aequi Libri 2002, p. 249: the authors 
suggest that the duty to give reasons, as conceived of by EU law, will have an inuence 
on national standards in this regard. 
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Law) have formulated what seems to be a  proposal for a  European 
‘administrative procedure act’, labelled the ‘ReNEUAL Model Rules 
2014’. The initiative is based on comparative research and cooperation 
between academics from various Member States. If implemented, its 
impact on domestic law would, however, be rather limited. Book III, on 
single-case decision making, for instance, which also mentions the duty 
to give reasons214 is applicable to administrative procedures by which an 
EU authority prepares and adopts a decision as defined in Article III-2.215 
It only applies to administrative procedures by which a  Member State 
authority prepares and adopts a decision as defined in Article III-2 insofar 
as EU sector-specific law renders it applicable, or insofar as a Member State 
chooses to accept it. 
83. The Model Rules are an academic and not an official document, but 
ReNEUAL has also expressed its support216 for the European Parliament’s 
Resolution of 15 January 2013 containing recommendations to the 
Commission on a Law of Administrative Procedure of the European Union. 
This initiative is inspired by the desire to codify the rules of administrative 
procedure applicable in the EU legal order. Its preamble refers to ‘a core set 
of principles of good administration […] currently widely accepted among 
Member States’.217 It also considers that ‘a European Law of Administrative 
Procedure could strengthen a  spontaneous convergence of national 
administrative law, with regard to general principles of procedure and 
the fundamental rights of citizens vis-à-vis the administration, and thus 
strengthen the process of integration’.218 It therefore requests the European 
Commission ‘to submit, on the basis of Article 298 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union219, a  proposal for a  regulation on 
a European Law of Administrative Procedure’. In an Annex, it therefore 
214  Article II-29: (1) e public authority shall state the reasons for its decisions 
in a  clear, simple and understandable manner. e statement of reasons must be 
appropriate to the decision and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the 
reasoning followed by the public authority which adopted the decision in such a way 
as to enable the parties to ascertain the reasons for the decision and to enable the 
competent court to exercise its powers of review. (2) e duty to provide reasons in 
cases of composite procedures will be shaped by the respective roles of the EU and the 
Member State in making the decision, as set out in Article III-24.
215  ‘Decision‘ means administrative action addressed to one or more individualised 
public or private persons which is adopted unilaterally by an EU authority, or by 
a Member State authority when Article III-1(2) is applicable, to determine one or more 
concrete cases with legally binding eect.’
216  http://www.reneual.eu/ (16.02.2015).
217  Recital O. 
218  Recital S. 
219  is article reads: 1. In carrying out their missions, the institutions, bodies, 
oces and agencies of the Union shall have the support of an open, ecient and 
independent European administration. 2. In compliance with the Sta Regulations 
and the Conditions of Employment adopted on the basis of Article 336, the European 
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anchors ‘detailed recommendations as to the content of the proposal 
requested’. Pursuant to recommendation 4.8, that concerns the duty to 
state reasons: 
Administrative decisions must clearly state the reasons on which they are 
based. They shall indicate the relevant facts and their legal basis.
They must contain an individual statement of reasons. If this is not possible due 
to the fact that a large number of persons are concerned by similar decisions, 
standard communications should be allowed. In that case, however, any citizen 
who expressly requests an individual statement of reasons should be provided 
with it.
The European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs has recently 
prepared a  proposal for a  Regulation on the Administrative Procedure 
of the European Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. The 
proposal, however, does not apply to the administrations of the Member 
States.220
Note on the language, period of research and list of abbreviations 
The authors have strived to ensure that all translations from Dutch and 
French to English remain as close as possible to the original text and/or 
their intentions. 
This article is based on research that was finalized on 15 February 2016; 
developments after that date could not be included. 
Awb (the Netherlands) Algemene wet bestuursrecht (General act administrative 
law)
CRPA (France) Code des relations entre le public et l’administration 
BS (Belgium) Belgisch Staatsblad (official journal of Belgium)
ECJ European Court of Justice
GwH (Belgium) Grondwettelijk Hof (Constitutional Court)
LMAA (France) Loi relative à la motivation des actes administratifs
RvS (Belgium) Raad van State (Council of State)
RvS-Wet (Belgium) Statute governing the organization and functioning of the 
Belgian Council of State
TEU Treaty on the European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Wet (Belgium) Statute voted at the federal level in Belgium
WMB (Belgium) Wet Motivering Bestuurshandelingen (Act on the duty to 
give reasons for administrative acts)
Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish provisions to that end.
220  See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/plmrep/COMMITTEES/
JURI/DV/2016/01–28/1081253EN.pdf. 
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Obowiązek uzasadniania decyzji administracyjnych jako instrument przejrzystego 
i rozliczalnego procesu decyzyjnego w administracji? Analiza porównawcza zapisów 
prawa administracyjnego belgijskiego, holenderskiego, francuskiego oraz Unii Europejskiej
Streszczenie
Obowiązek uzasadniania decyzji uważany jest powszechnie za niezbędną gwarancję 
procesową dostępną dla obywateli we wszystkich nowoczesnych europejskich syste-
mach prawa administracyjnego. Analiza porównawcza przeprowadzona w niniejszym 
artykule pokazuje jednak, iż nadal istnieją poważne różnice pomiędzy wyobrażeniami 
dotyczącymi tego obowiązku w różnych systemach prawnych w Europie. W opraco-
waniu zaprezentowano argumenty przemawiające za istotną rolą obowiązku przedsta-
wiania uzasadnienia pod kątem sprzyjania przejrzystości oraz rozliczalności postrze-
ganych jako zasady dobrego rządzenia. Jako instrument zapewnienia rozliczalności 
administracji analizowany obowiązek ma swe ograniczenia, odgrywa on jednak pewną 
rolę w stosunkach pomiędzy administracją a osobami podlegającym jej konkretnym 
(zazwyczaj indywidualnym) decyzjom. W tym kontekście pojawia się pytanie, czy sta-
tus obowiązku przedstawiania uzasadnienia ewoluuje w  stronę statusu posiadanego 
przez jednostkowe prawo człowieka. 
Słowa kluczowe: obowiązek uzasadniania decyzji administracyjnych, Europa, 
perspektywa porównawcza, przejrzystość, rozliczalność
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The Duty to Give Reasons in the European Legal Area: a Mechanism for Transparent and 
Accountable Administrative Decision-Making? 
A Comparison of Belgian, Dutch, French and EU Administrative Law
Abstract
e duty to give reasons is generally thought of as an indispensable procedural guar-
antee that is oered to citizens in all modern European administrative law systems. 
e comparative analysis carried out in this article, however, reveals that important 
dierences continue to exist between the way in which various legal systems within 
Europe conceive of that duty. e article furthermore argues that the duty to give rea-
sons has an important role to play in the furtherance of transparency and accountability 
as principles of good governance. However, it also has its limitations as an instrument 
for keeping the administration accountable. Up until today, the duty to give reasons 
primarily has a role to play in the relationship between the administration and those 
individuals that are subject to its specic (mostly individual) decisions. In that context, 
the question arises whether the status of the duty to give reasons is evolving towards 
that of an individual human right. 
Keywords: duty to give reasons, Europe, comparative perspective, transparency, 
accountability 
